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Is there a point at which pharmaceutical laws favor research too much,
at the expense ofthe affordability that comes from price competition? How
should a proper balance be struck? Is a premium in earnings over what
other sectors earn necessary to spur research in the pharmaceutical sector?
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If so, how big should that premium be? Does increasing the premium
through further intellectual property protection always lead to more and
better research?'

I. INTRODUCTION

In this Article, I seek to contribute the current initiatives to provide
access to and increase the affordability of drugs and health services
available to low-end consumers facing life threatening illnesses, such as
AIDS. In particular, I explore the potential of market-based arguments, and
in so doing, expand the existing repertoire of responses that traditionally
characterize the advancement of legal and social causes. However, I do not
discount the importance ofbasing advancing legal and social causes on nonmarket based premises. I rather proceed from the premise that marketbased approaches to advancing social and legal causes can be pursued in
conjunction with approaches such as rights.
As such, I pursue three different strategies of providing, especially to
low-end income consumers, access and affordability to AIDS drugs. The
first is the use of social and economic rights as most recently tested under
the South African Constitution. The second and third approaches are
market-based. For example, the second approach explores TRIPSconsistent2 possibilities of balancing the interests of pharmaceuticals
producers on the one hand and the interests of low-end pharmaceuticals
consumers with life-threatening diseases on the other. In this approach, I
proceed from an internal inquiry into the possibilities that the TRIP S regime
offers protection to both consumers and producers of intellectual property
while also safeguarding their respective economic and other interests.
The major claim made here is that TRIPS is based on a private property
model that exhibits two logics in tension with each other. The first of these
logics is that of property as a market commodity. The second is a public

1. Edward Hore, A Comparison of United States and Canadian Laws as They Affect
Generic Pharmaceutical Market Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 388 (2000).
2. TRIPS stands for "Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights." Jerome H.
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPSAgreement,
29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 12 (1996-97). The TRIPS Agreement "established a basic
framework for balancing legal incentives to create against the public interest in free competition."
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policy perspective that proceeds from the view that there are circumstances
under which property can be legitimately encumbered with public regulation
to strike a balance between the interests of producers and consumers of
items subject to intellectual property rights (IPR). My claim is that the
commodity logic ofIPR protection simultaneously and dialectically coexists
with an alternative logic of IPR protection that recognizes, as legitimate,
the accommodation of public policy concerns that fall within the purview
of the TRIPS agreement. Within this approach, I also examine the scope of
discretion that developing countries have in defining standards of patent
eligibility, non-obviousness and novelty, thereby leading to the emergence
of a state practice consistent with certain public policy goals such as
facilitating the availability of essential medicines for low-end consumers.
The third approach identifies how FDA regulation imposes barriers to
entry in the pharmaceutical industry in a manner that limits expeditious
access to affordable AIDS drugs. Hence, its basic thesis is that the problems
of low-end pharmaceutical consumers facing life-threatening illnesses are
related to the FDA's regulatory framework pertaining to the pharmaceutical
industry. The FDA's regulatory framework for pre-marketing testing and
approval is driven by the need to protect the public by eliminating, or
minimizing to the greatest extent possible, drug-related risks. This
regulatory framework, which was built largely in response to perverse
notions of risk, results in high barriers of entry into the pharmaceutical
industry for small and new companies, as well as for drugs approved in
other countries. The effect of the exclusionary impact of this framework is
the monopolization of the pharmaceutical industry. My proposed approach
thus advocates a consumer-driven, anti-cartelist strategy to end
pharmaceutical industry concentration as a method for addressing
affordability and accessibility of pharmaceutical products for low-end
consumers facing life-threatening illnesses. The upshot of my claim here is
that the FDA's regulatory framework is a form of governmental
intervention that constitutes an anti-competitive mechanism.
My premise here is predicated upon the desire to foster competition in
the pharmaceutical industry as the best way of ensuring affordable and
accessible pharmaceutical products.

3. See id. at 16; see also Samuel A. Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of
Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 461-69 (1996) (discussing strategies
to mitigate the initial economic costs of TRIPS).

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 264 2001-2002

RIGHTS, PATENTS, MARKETS AND THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC

Unlike the property as market commodity approach embodied in the
TRIPS Agreement, a competition-driven pharmaceutical industry would
ensure a fair return to owners of IPRs, thereby balancing the interests of
producers of pharmaceuticals with IPR protection on the one hand and
consumers of these pharmaceutical products on the other. Here, I regard
full and free competition as the most legitimate pricing mechanism.
In short, my argument is that an increase in intellectual property
protection, such as that provided by TRIPS, necessarily involves a
reduction in competition.4 The increase in intellectual property protection
provided by TRIPS implies that the framers of that agreement thought that
a monopoly period of twenty years for pharmaceuticals would provide the
optimal level of incentive to induce innovation and enhance consumer
welfare.5 However, it is arguable that increasing intellectual property
protection has not eliminated piracy or even enhanced consumer welfare,
and that a competition-driven policy would complement intellectual
property protection by enhancing consumer welfare and addressing issues
related to piracy and patent infringements.6 Indeed, as I argue in this
Article, violations of competition policy might ameliorate the shortfalls of
intellectual property protection. For example, competition can increase

4. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection:A Reappraisal,97 HARv. L. REV.
1815, 1816 (1984).
5. See generallyAgreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS].
6. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court was evenly split on this very point in K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier,Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). At issue in that case was an interpretation by the Customs
Department of trademark law that U.S. trademark owners could not bar the importation of
genuinely marked goods made by foreign subsidiaries. Id. at 285. The Justices split as to whether
a Customs Service regulation designed by the Treasury Department should be based on strong
intellectual property protection or on a competition-based policy that would allow gray market
imports. Id. at 291. The holding of the case is confined to instances in which American
corporations consent to the use of trademarks by importers. See id. at 293-95. Four Justices
(Rehnquist, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia) favored a policy based on strong intellectual
property protection, which would give trademark holders monopoly power over intrabrand
competition. See id. at 286-95. Four other Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White)
favored a competition-based policy that would allow gray-market imports to compete with locally
manufactured goods bearing the same trademarks. See id. at 287-88, 295-317 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Hence, there was a split between those Justices who
believed that intellectual property protection would best enhance technological innovation and
consumer welfare and those who supported the view that competition would best enhance
consumer welfare. See id. at 291.
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consumer welfare by lowering production costs and passing the benefits of
technological innovation on to consumers.
Another major innovation in this Article is that it does'not argue that
antitrust law and trade laws only operate at odds with each other. It is not
necessarily the case that antitrust laws only protect consumers and that
trade laws only protect domestic industry from the effects of unfair foreign
trade.7 Rather, antitrust laws and trade laws complement each other in
promoting the interests of industry and consumers.' For example, in Pfizer,
Inc. v. India,9 the U.S. Supreme Court was invited to decide whether it
could treat a sovereign nation in the same manner as it did U.S. citizens and
states under the Sherman Act. ° In this case, the governments of India, Iran,
and the Philippines, among others, sought damages against Pfizer, alleging
price fixing, market division, and fraud upon the U.S. Patent Office. " Pfizer
brought the case to challenge an order of the Federal Trade Commission
requiring it and American Cyanamid to grant licenses under patents it held
with Cyanamid in respect of a broad spectrum antibiotics to applicants from
India, Iran, and the Philippines."2
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws of the United
States provide no alternative remedies for foreign nations, as they do for
U.S. citizens and states. 3 As such, a foreign nation can sue for treble
damages if it can show that it, like a domestic state, has been injured in its
business or property by antitrust violations.' 4 Therefore, nations can use
antitrust laws to seek remedies for unfair trade practices in the same way
that they can under trade laws.'
7. See Christopher M. Barbuto, Note, Toward Convergence ofAntitrust and Trade Law:
An InternationalTrade Analogue to Robinson-Patman,62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2047, 2051-52,
2089-94 (1994).
8. ld. at 2051.
9. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
10. Id. at 309.
11. Id. at 309-10.
12. Id. at 310 n.2.
13. Id. at 318.
14. Pfizer,Inc., 434 U.S. at 318.
15. See Robert D. Anderson, The Interface Between CompetitionPolicy and Intellectual
Propertyin the Context of the InternationalTrading System, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 655, 655-60
(1998) (exploring the relationship between competition policy and intellectual property rights);
Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition and Intellectual Property: TRIPS and Its Antitrust
Counterparts,29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 482 (1996) (arguing that the need to ensure
competition-based law does not undermine the obligations of TRIPS); Hans Ullrich, TRIPS:
Adequate Protection,Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, in ANTITRUST: A NEW
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? 153, 193-95 (John 0. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995)
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The Pfizer case is particularly relevant with regard to how the Court
reflected upon the use of antitrust laws in foreign commerce. In his
dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger, who wasjoined by Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, found that statutory language, legislative history, and
Supreme Court precedents denied foreign states the standing to sue under
the Sherman Act. In Chief Justice Burger's view:
[I]t takes little imagination to realize the dramatic and very real
differences in terms of coercive economic power and political
interests which distinguish our own States from foreign sovereigns.
The international price fixing, boycotts, and other current
anticompetitive practices undertaken by some Middle Eastern
nations are illustrative of the weapons in the arsenals of foreign
nations which no domestic State could ever employ. Nor do our
domestic States, in any meaningful sense, have the conflicting
economic interests or antagonistic ideologies which characterize and
enliven the relations among nation states. 6
However, as Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted:
While the Chief Justice's dissent says that there are "weapons [such
as cartels or boycotts] in the arsenals of foreign nations" sufficient
to enable them to counter anticompetitive conduct,... such...
political remed[ies are] hardly available to a foreign nation faced
with monopolistic control of the supply of medicines needed for the
health and safety of its people. 7
Indeed, this is the issue in this Article: how to best use the legal and
market-based options available to countries and communities who face the
monopolization of their supply of medicines, not only for the health and
safety of their people in general, but specifically for low-end consumers
facing life-threatening illnesses. In Part II, I demonstrate that although
AIDS drugs offer new hope for AIDS patients, particularly in industrialized

(analyzing the relationship between trade and competition policy under TRIPS); Spencer Weber
Waller, The InternationalizationofAntitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 349-60 (1997)
(discussing the failure of international harmonization efforts and the success of regional efforts).
16. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 327-28 (Burger, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 318.
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nations, using rights-based enforcement creates enormous challenges,
especially for low-end consumers in countries like South Africa.
In Part III, I show that the place of social policy, such as in the
provision of AIDS drugs to low-end consumers, faces a built-in problem of
international economic governance. This built-in problem is a public/private
split that is biased against the inclusion of public policy goals that are
inconsistent with free trade/IPR protection in the GATT/WTO framework.
In Part IV, I explore the tension between commodity and public policyoriented perspectives of TRIPS. This tension is part of the ambiguous
legacy of social policy in international economic governance that can be
exploited in favor of facilitating access to AIDS drugs for low-end
consumers.
In Part V, I examine the variety of barriers to entry into the
pharmaceutical industry for new firms, as well as to access to affordable
AIDS drugs.
II. ALTHOUGH HIV/AIDS DRUG COCKTAILS OFFER NEW HOPE, THERE
ARE CHALLENGES TO USING A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
STRATEGY TO REALIZE THIS FOR Low- END CONSUMERS

"AIDS, an acronym for acquired immune deficiency syndrome, is an
impairment of the body's ability to fight disease. It leaves the affected
to illnesses that a healthy immune system might
individual vulnerable
8
overcome."
AIDS patients suffer from weakened immune systems that make them
susceptible to opportunistic infections caused by fungi (yeasts), viruses,
bacteria, and protozoans. Other Symptoms of AIDS include unusual
pneumonia caused by the protozoan Pneumosystiscarinii,or a rare cancer
of the skin known as Kaposi's Sarcoma (KS). AIDS is contracted through
blood, breast milk, semen and vaginal/cervical secretions.
Today, the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa is AIDS. In
southern African countries, the infection rate is as high as 20% of the
population. In 1999, for example, Botswana had an infection rate of
35.80%, Swaziland 25.25%, Zimbabwe 25.06%, Lesotho 23.57%, and

18. AIDS FAcrs AND ISsUES 4 (Victor Gang & Norman Rudnick eds., 1986).
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South Africa 19.94%. 9By 1999, at least fifteen million Africans had died
ofAIDS and another twenty-five million in sub-Saharan Africa were living
with the disease.2" Four million sub-Saharan Africans were newly infected
in 1999.21

A. The InternationalHealth Crisis
AIDS is a treatable disease, contrary to the view that it is a death
warrant. In the United States, for example, drug treatment has quadrupled
the median survival time from one to four years for Americans diagnosed
with AIDS.22 This stunning achievement is the result of a combination of
initiatives that hasgalvanized public attention in treating AIDS for about
twenty years. Intense public pressure on the government and the
pharmaceutical industry by AIDS activists, including the efforts of nongovernmental organizations working with AIDS patients, has led to greater
availability of and accessibility to AIDS drugs and health and support
services for AIDS patients.
Among these initiatives is the availability of a complex combination of
drugs known as a cocktail. A cocktail includes protease inhibitors and
reverse transcriptase inhibitors. These drugs interrupt the cycle of HIV
infection, allow an infected person's immune system to rebuild itself, and
allow the person to live much longer than the person would without
treatment.23 In the United States, a strict cocktail regimen costs on average
between $10,000 and $15,000 per year.24 These regimens have reduced
mortality rates by a phenomenal 75% in the United States.25 AZT
(Zidovudine) has been shown to reduce mother-to-child transmission by up

19. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS
EPIDEMIC 124 (2000) [hereinafter UNAIDS REPORT], available at http://www.unaids.org/
epidemic update/report/Epireport.htm.
20. Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Steps Up Fight Against AIDS in Africa (Sept.
14, 2000).
21. UNAIDS REPORT, supra note 19, at 8.
22. US. Study Finds AIDS Patients Surviving Longer, available at http://www.cnn.com/
2001/HEALTH/conditions/03/1 4/ aids.survival.reut/index.html (Mar. 14, 2001).
23. Lawrence 0. Gustin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Name Debate": The Case for
National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REv. 679, 700 (1998).
24. Linda C. Fentiman, AIDS as a Chronic Illness: A Cautionary Tale for the End ofthe
Twentieth Century, 61 ALB. L. REV. 989, 1004 (1998).
25. Bernard Hirschel & Patrick Francioli, Progress and Problems in the Fight Against
AIDS, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 906, 906-08 (1998).

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 269 2001-2002

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14

to 70% when administered to the mother during pregnancy or to the child
immediately after birth.26 By contrast, in sub-Saharan Africa and for lowend consumers in general, AIDS has become history's worst pandemic
because, in part, the cocktails that have been used successfully in the United
States are too expensive." In addition, the provision of health servicEs has
been undermined substantially by reallocation of funds to other sectors of
the economy. 28 It seems, therefore, that unless measures are taken to
provide affordable drugs to the millions in Africa with AIDS, they may be
"already ...beyond hope. 29
In Brazil, the government has produced at least five generic AIDS drugs
that have been available to its citizens for free since 1997. Brazil's policy
of universal access to AIDS drugs has led to dramatic reductions in the rate
of AIDS deaths and the incidence of opportunistic infections. While the
death rate between 1996 and 1999 fell by about half, the rate of incidence
of opportunistic infections fell by 60-80%.3" The Brazilian government
invested over U.S. $339 million in 1999 and over U.S. $462 million into the
project in 2000. 31 In January 2001, the United States requested that the
WTO establish a panel to determine the legality of Brazil's compulsory
licensing laws.32
As the experience of the United States and Brazil demonstrates, AIDS
is a treatable disease, and levels of infection can drop dramatically with
increased availability of drugs, so the same should also be true for subSaharan Africa. While the AIDS problem in Africa is part of a bigger
picture of a health sector in crisis,33 that is no reason not to take action to
26. Eileen M. Mckenna, Note, The Mandatory Testing of Newbornsfor HIV: Too Much,
Too Little, Too Late, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 307, 330-31 (1997).
27. Remarkably, the reform programs (which reduced public spending and the introduction
of fees) of the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) in the health sector have
exacerbated the pandemic, putting an enormous strain on public health delivery. Marc Epprecht,
Investing in Amnesia, or Fantasyand Forgetfulnessin the World Bank'sApproach to Healthcare
Reform in Sub-SaharanAfrica, 31 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 337, 337-56 (1997).
28. MEREDETH TuRsHEN, PRiVATZiNG HEALTH SERvicEs INAFRICA 114-16 (1999).
29. Barton Gellman, An Unequal Calculus of Life and Death: As Millions Perished in
Pandemic,Firms DebatedAccess to Drugs, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al.
30. UNAIDS REPORT, supra note 19, at 101.
31. Id. at 102; see also Stephen Buckley, Brazil Becomes Model in FightAgainst AIDS,
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2000, at A22.
32. See Brazil- MeasuresAffecting PatentProtection- Requestfor the Establishmentof
a Panel by the UnitedStates, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS199/3 (01-0093) (2001), availableat http://
www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazilVReq4EstabPanel.html.

33. The pharmaceutical industry in particular makes this argument to blunt criticism that
the high cost of drugs is one of the reasons for the spread of the AIDS pandemic. See
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facilitate access to affordable AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa. There can
be no gainsaying that low income levels in sub-Saharan Africa make costs
of over $10,000 per year prohibitive. Yet, the pharmaceutical industry has
quietly argued that selling AIDS drugs at discounts in sub-Saharan Africa
portends doom with respect to the ability to finance further research and
development. In effect, it argues that the AIDS crisis in Africa is intractable
because providing AIDS drugs, which still enjoy patent protection in
Western markets, conflicts with its commercial objectives.34 The handouts
that pharmaceutical companies have announced are laudable, but the
existence of such handouts does not address the question of affordability in
the long term. In addition, it is possible that these ad hoc responses and the
infrequency with which AIDS drugs are consumed in Africa may contribute
to the creation of drug-resistant strains of the virus.35
However, addressing the needs of low-end consumers is not a problem
specific to sub-Saharan Africa. Low-end consumers (consumers with little
or no income) who have HIV, are found in all countries of the world. Thus,
while most of these consumers are in sub-Saharan Africa, the problem is an
international one, not merely a regional one. In this Article, I join with
others in moving from the premise that, since AIDS is treatable, we should
vigilantly seek all possible solutions to resolve this problem of unequal
access to AIDS drugs between low and high-income HIV patients. I do so
in three ways. In the following section, I examine the possibilities and
limitations ofusing a rights strategy by examining recent relevant case-law
in South Africa. Second, I reframe the TRIPS agreement not only as
embodying the intellectual property rights protection of pharmaceutical
corporations, but also as incorporating two logics of private property that
are in tension with each other: a commodity logic that largely favors
industry and a public-oriented logic that legitimizes departures from the
commodity logic in order to address certain public health concerns such as
AIDS. Third, I argue that a competition-based pharmaceutical industry,
freed from the barriers to entry put in place by the FDA, would lower drug
prices and facilitate their access to low-end consumers.

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AccEss TO

HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 53-54 (2000).

34. Gellman, supra note 29.
35. See Fentiman, supra note 24, at 1006-07.
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B. The InternationalHuman Rights Framework
The International Bill of Human Rights comprises three basic
instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,36 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 37 and the International Covenant on
Social and Economic Rights. 3 ' The rights guaranteed under these
instruments can be categorized into three groups: civil and political rights
(such as the rights to conscience,39 exercise of religion,' freedom of
movement, 4' and expression and assembly); 42 social and economic rights
(such as the rights to education, 43 work,'4 and health);45 and group rights
(such as the right to self determination).46 In addition to the International
Bill of Human Rights, there are other international and regional human
rights instruments, such as the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women,47 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,4 ' and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights that
guarantees certain social and economic rights.

1. Access and Affordability of Drugs and Support Services: The Right to
Health as a Social Justice Agenda
There are enormous gaps in the availability of AIDS drugs and services
between high and low-income patients around the world. Low income or
poor people are also excluded from health service delivery systems in
developing countries because ofthe increased privatization of government
36. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,

Pt. I, Res., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
37. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

38. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
39. See ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 18.
40. See id.
41. See id art. 12.
42. Seeid. art. 21.
43. See ICESCR, supra note 38, art. 13.
44. See id. art. 6.
45. See id. art. 12.

46. Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR have an identical article, one which recognizes the
right to self determination. See ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 38, art. 1.
47. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
48. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
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subsidized health care systems. This raises fundamental questions of
responsibility on the part of governments and the private health sector in
these countries to develop equity enhancing health delivery systems.49 The
wide variety of definitions of the right, or entitlement, to health care that
exists to define the role of the state can be reduced to two approaches. A
first approach defines health in negative terms as the absence of disease,
impairment, or infirmity. A second approach defines health in positive terms
as not merely the absence of disease but as a state of complete physical and
social well-being.5 °
The Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights notes that the
right to health under Article 12(2) of the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights embraces a wide range of socioeconomic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a
healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as
food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate
sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy
environment."
This definition falls in the second positive and expansive definition of the
right to health, which in turn implicates obligations on states to ensure
"equality, equity, well-being, fairness, and justice in reforming health
systems -. reducing disparities, respecting difference, and eliminating
inequities in health worldwide." 2 This-view or definition ofhealth rights is
particularly relevant in the context of poor people infected or at risk of
infection with HIV who have no access to "HIV-related goods for
prevention and care including drugs necessary for HIV/AIDS care" and

49. General Comment 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (2000)
[hereinafter General Comment 14]. The Committee interprets the right to health, as defined in
article 12. 1, as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health care but also
to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate
sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and
environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and information, including sexual
and reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the population in all
health-related decision-making at the community, national, and international levels. Id. 11.
50. See Obijiofor Aginam, Public Health Law in South Africa, 8 IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 480 (2001).

51. General Comment 14, supra note 49, 4.
52. See Global Assembly on Advancing the Human Right to Health, Iowa City Appeal on
Advancing the Human Right to Health, Apr. 22, 2001, at 2, available at http://www.hsph.
harvard.edu/ fxbcenter/lowaCityappeal.pdf.

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 273 2001-2002

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14

where the development of vaccines to respond to their specific needs is
slow, non-existent, or under-funded."
The right to health, especially in the context of those infected with HIV,
raises two related legal implications. First is the challenge of defining the
scope of the legal content of the right. For example, is it a negative or
positive right? This task is complicated by the fact that whatever
constitutional provision or international legal guarantee to health you turn
to, its interpretation is defined by both the text as well as "the
argumentative tools that legal culture makes available to judges trying to
generate the effect of legal necessity. 54 In other words, interpretation of
such a right to health is invariably contested because there is no single
criteria by which we can determine whether a particular interpretation of
the right to health approximates to such a criteria. For example, an
interpretation of a right to health might depend simultaneously on the
definition of the right and also on the interpreter's training, skill, and
insight, and the choices she makes about how to allocate her intellectual
energies and resources. These choices must ultimately turn on political
sensibilities and convictions that cannot be derived entirely from the legal
materials, since it is often the case that the meaning and constraining power
of the legal materials is unknown or uncertain without the intervention of
legal work."
A second implication, not unrelated to the first, is the challenge posed
to interpreters to not only construe the right to health consistently with the
legal text as indicated by the first challenge, but to relate to the particular
social, historical, and economic context; and the capacity of the institutions
in question to enforce the right. Seeking to enforce the right to health for
those infected with HIV raises both implications of fidelity to text as well
as the larger issues of social justice (matters which pose great challenges to
its enforcement).

53. Id. at 5.
54. DuNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SItCLE 797 (1997).
55. Karl Klare, The Politics of Duncan Kennedy's Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 1087
(2001).
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2. Some Limitations of Using a Rights Approach
in a Social Justice Agenda
Bruno Simma and Philip Alston have posed the limitation of the social
agenda for human rights in the following terms: "it must be asked whether
any theory human rights law which.. . finds no place for a right of access
to primary health care is not flawed in terms both of the theory of human
rights and of United Nations (U.N.) doctrine."56 The treatment of social and
economic rights as secondary to civil and political rights has roots in
exclusively locating authority for human rights norms in whether or not the
role of the state is implicated. On this view of rights, the role of the state is
to abstain from interfering with its citizens' civil and political rights. These
include such rights as to conscience, assembly, association, and movement.
The assumption here is that the background social and economic context
is pre-political in the sense that state involvement would destabilize its
naturalness. Government intervention is regarded as an artificial imposition
or interference with a pre-existing objective state of affairs.
Hence, the role of government in relation to rights is regarded with
suspicion unless it is limited by restraint so that citizens have freedom to
exercise their rights. Conversely, where the government positively engages
in fulfilling rights that require affirmative involvement (such as health,
housing, and education) the understanding is that it is illegitimately
redistributing resources rather than leaving that role to the invisible and
neutral forces of the market. The historical origins of this theory of rights
is related to the defeat of feudalism in medieval Europe and overcoming
absolute monarchical rule." That this distrust of centralized power also
pervades legal and economic thought today is an understatement, especially
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increasing global pace
of dismantling the vestiges of command and control economies and their
replacement with free market prescriptions.
Another reason for the skepticism regarding social and economic rights
arises from the premise that there is no basis to regard social and economic
issues in terms of rights because they are needs or wants that can be best

56. Bruno Simma & Philip AIston, The Sources ofHuman Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens
and GeneralPrinciples, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 94 (1992).
57. See GUIDO DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 1-66 (R.G.
Collingwood trans., 1927).
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provided for through the marketplace or by making need-based demands.5"
Provisioning through the market presupposes that the various wants or
desires of people are aggregated to produce demand for certain goods and
services. On this view, the market, rather than the government, would be
best able to provide these goods and services without misallocating
resources. In allocating resources as such, the market promotes further
growth, providing those without capital the opportunities to sell their labor
to the owners of capital. This is in contrast to a situation where the
government undermines private property ownership by allocating resources
on some other criteria other than through the market.
In the 1970s, this market-based model of economic growth, as
promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the
Bretton Woods institutions), came under criticism.59 This criticism was
informed by studies demonstrating that, notwithstanding increases in
economic growth in developing countries that adopted this market based
approach, there was a simultaneous increase in poverty and inequality. In
addition, these developing countries were becoming increasingly dependent
on European and North American economies and their technologies, which
in turn undermined their potential to develop their own indigenous
industries. The Bretton Woods institutions responded by re-orienting their
development programs in developing countries in a re-packaged
development approach referred to as "Redistribution With Growth."' This
resulted in increasing loans to developing countries to meet basic needs
such as education and health, but it was by no means intended to change the
focus ofthe productive economy away from providing non-essential goods
and services for a minority group of high income citizens.
Although international human rights advocacy for social and economic
rights was still in its infancy at this time, its leading exponents joined the
critique of economic development as growth embodied in the basic needs
movement of the early 1970s. The strategy that these human rights lawyers
employed was to ground the basic needs approach in the framework of
rights. By substituting rights for needs, they sought to transform the
58. For example, Mark Tushnet argued that "people need food and shelter now, and
demanding that those needs be satisfied strikes me as more likely to succeed than claiming that
existing rights to food or shelter must be enforced." An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363,
1394 (1984).
59. This story is discussed at length in James Gathii, Good Governance as a CounterInsurgency Agenda to TransformativeSocial Projects in InternationalLaw, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 107, 135-41 (1999) [hereinafter Good Governance].
60. Id. at 132.
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concept of needs into a legal entitlement. For these lawyers, to assert that
a particular social claim or need was a human right, was to "invest it
emotionally and morally with an especially high degree of legitimacy." '
However, in the cold war context of the 1970s, this novel strategy of
claiming that certain social claims were human rights was met with the
rebuttal that social and economic rights are not justiciable. Critics argued
that social and economic rights are so vague and imprecise that they did not
establish imperatives that could be enforced by a court of law in the same
way civil and political rights do. This vagueness, it was argued, was
evidenced in the language of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). For example, under the ICESCR,
states are required to recognize the rights to work, health, education, social
security, an adequate standard of living, just and favorable conditions of
work, and to participate in and enjoy the fruits of culture and science. By
contrast, rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) are declared. In some cases, parties to the ICESCR undertake to
.ensure a right. This also contrasts with rights under the Civil and Political
Covenant in which rights are declared and ensured rather than recognized,
or require the state to undertake to ensure.
In addition to the lack of categorical language protecting social and
economic rights, the ICESCR was also faulted for making social and
economic rights subject to the principle of progressive realization rather
than immediate realization as in the ICCPR. A further limitation cited
against the ICESCR is that the obligations require states to undertake steps
to the maximum availableresources.62 Through its General Comments, the

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has clarified the legal
obligations that state parties have against the backdrop of references to
progressive realization and to maximum available resources. Hence, it has
observed that the concept of progressive realization "should not be
misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. It is,
on one hand, a necessary flexible device, reflecting the realities of the real
world and the difficulties involved for a country in ensuring full realization
of economic, social and cultural rights.'6l The reference to maximum
available resources can only be invoked if a state can "demonstrate that
61. Id. at 135.
62. ICESCR, supra note 38, art. 2(1).
63. See General Comment 3, The Nature of States Parties Obligations (art. 2, 1 1 of the
Covenant), U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cul. Rts., 5th Sess., 9, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (1990).
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every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in
4
an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations."'6
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also
concluded that the ICESCR requires every state party to ensure the
satisfaction of a minimum core obligation of"at the very least, minimum
essential levels of each of the rights." 5
A further point must be noted here. In the cold war context, social and
economic rights were associated with the economic theories underlying the
Soviet Union's command and control policies. In Western free market
economies, these policies were regarded with circumspection because they
were often characterized as the antithesis of not only free market
economies, but also of liberal democratic freedoms. This cold war
ideological confrontation between East and West did little to give
credibility to social and economic rights.
Notwithstanding this tortured history, social and economic rights have
received increasing attention in the international community, especially in
the post-cold war period. For example, the 1993 U.N. Vienna Conference
on Human Rights emphasized the indivisibility and interdependence
between social and economic rights on the one hand and civil and political
rights on the other." Thus, there is an increasing commitment to emphasize
this interdependence rather than the priority ofcivil and political rights over
social, economic, and cultural rights.67

3. South Africa: Challenges to Constitutional Enforcement
of Social and Economic Rights
One of the most elaborate set of protections of social and economic
rights is contained in the South African Constitution. The preamble to the
South African Constitution declares that in consideration of the injustices
ofthe apartheid regime, it was adopted with a view to "heal divisions ofthe
past ... establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and

64. Id. 10.
65. Id.
66. Shadrack B.O. Gutto, Beyond Justiciability: Challenges of Implementing/Enforcing
Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87 (1998).
67. For a good analysis, see Craig Scott, Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the
Categoryof "Economic, Social and CulturalRights," 21 HuM. RTs. Q. 633 (1999).
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fundamental human rights." ' Its Bill of Rights, Section 26(1) provides,
"Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing." Section 26(1)
qualifies this right by providing that "[tihe state must take reasonable
measures, to achieve the progressive realization ofthis right." Section 27(1)
provides, "Everyone has the right of access to (a) health care services,
including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c)
social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their
dependents, appropriate social assistance." Section 27(2) provides that the
"state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these
rights." Finally Section 27(3) provides, "No one may be refused emergency
medical treatment."
The novelty of these provisions is in enshrining social and economic
rights in the Bill of Rights, a fact that is further fortified by the references
in the South African Constitution to international human rights law as part
of the source of law in South Africa. Hence, although the concepts of
progressive realization69 and available resources"0 are incorporated in the

68. D.P. Mohammed inAzanian PeoplesOrganizationv. Presidentofthe Republic ofSouth
Africa, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC), observed that
[f]or decades South African history has been dominated by a deep conflict
between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political
instruments of the state and a majority who sought to resist that domination.
Fundamental rights became a major casualty of this conflict as the resistance of
those punished by their denial was met by laws designed to counter the
effectiveness of such resistance. The conflict deepened with the increased
sophistication of the economy, the rapid acceleration of knowledge and education
and the ever increasing hostility of an international community steadily outraged
by the inconsistency which had become manifest between its own articulated
ideals after the second World War and the official practices which had become
institutionalized in South Africa... .During the eighties it became manifest to all
that our country... was on a disaster course unless conflict was reversed. It was
this realization which mercifully rescued us in the early nineties as those who
controlled the levers of state power began to negotiate a different future with
those who had been imprisoned, silenced or driven into exile in consequence of
their resistance to that control and its consequences. Those negotiations resulted
in an interim Constitution committed to a transition towards a more just,
defensible and democratic political order based on the protection of fundamental
human rights.
69. In Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC),
Justice Yacoob observed that the requirement of progressive realization "means that accessibility
[in the context of the right to access to housing] should be progressively facilitated; legal,
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South African Bill of Rights, the protections in the Bill of Rights overcome
traditional objections to the justiciability of social and economic rights."'
One articulate objection on this ground defined rights as "something that
can and, from a moral point of view, should be respected here and now. If
it is violated, justice is itself abused." 2
Such an objection claims no rights, status for social and economic
claims, as if their infringement was not an affront to justice, howsoever
defined.
Notwithstanding objections ofthe enforceability of social and economic
rights here and now, in 1997 the South African Constitutional Court was
invited to decide whether the denial of renal dialysis to a forty-one year old
unemployed diabetic man by a government hospital contravened Section
27(3) of the South African Bill of Rights.73 This case is particularly relevant

in the context of terminally-ill patients such as those suffering from AIDS.
The analogy is particularly striking because Thiagraj Soobramoney, the

administrative, operational and financial hurdles should be examined and, where possible,
lowered over time." Id. 45.
70. Justice Yacoob observed that the provision within available resources ought to be
construed so that measures to meet the right of access to housing "must be calculated to attain the
goal expeditiously and effectively but the availability of resources is an important factor in
determining what is reasonable." Id 46.
71. Justice Yacoob said, "[7The issue of whether socio-economic rights are justiciable at all
in South Africa has been put beyond question by the text of our Constitution as construed in the
Certification judgment" Id. 20. The certification judgment referred to here (Ex Parte
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) 78); in addition to holding that socioeconomic rights were justiciable, also held that, at the very minimum, they "can be negatively
protected from improper invasion." In this case, the South African Constitutional Court was
invited to decide whether the inclusion of social and economic rights in the then interim
Constitution of South Africa violated the separation of powers doctrine because the judiciary
would invade the province of the legislative and executive branches of government that have to
make decisions on budgetary allocations. The South African Constitutional Court rejected this
objection to the inclusion of social and economic rights in the South African Constitution.
72. Maurice Cranston, Are There Human Rights?, DAEDALUS, No. 4, Fall 1983, at 14.
Cranston further avers that a human right, by definition, is something that no one, anywhere may
be deprived of without a grave affront to justice.... If rights of a different order are introduced,
everything is immediately slackened: the sharp, clear imperative becomes a vague wish ....
Thus
the effect of a universal declaration that is overloaded with affirmations of economic and social
rights is to push the civil and political rights out of the realm of the morally compelling into the
twilight world of utopian aspirations. Id. at 12. For reports on activities of NGO's bias towards
civil and political rights and against social and economic rights, see James Gathii & Celestine
Nyamu, Reflections on UnitedStates-BasedHuman Rights NGO 's Work on Africa, 9 HARV. HUM.

RTS. J. 285 (1996).
73. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
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diabetic appellant in this case, also suffered from both ischaemic heart and
cerbro-vascular diseases. This combination of diseases made him dependent
on health support services in a manner analogous, but not similar to AIDS
patients whose lives depend on access to AIDS cocktails, medical, and
other support services.
In his appeal to the South African Constitutional Court, Soobramoney
argued that since he suffered from a terminal illness and his life depended
on whether or not he had renal dialysis, Section 27(3) of the Constitution
entitled him to such treatment. He argued that the entitlement required that
the state provide funding and resources necessary for the realization of this
right. The essence of this argument lay in the claim that the words
"emergency medical treatment" under Section 27(3) of the South African
Constitution included an obligation on the part of the state to provide
"ongoing medical treatment of chronic illnesses for the purpose of
prolonging life." 4 The South African Constitutional Court in response to
this argument noted:
What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations
imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 in regard to access to
housing, health care, food, water and social security are dependent
upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of
resources. Given this lack of resources and the significant demands
on them that have already been referred to, an unqualified obligation
to meet these needs would not presently be capable of being fulfilled.
This is the context within which Section 27(3) must be construed."'
Perhaps anticipating such a response, Soobramoney had further argued
that Section 27(3) should be interpreted consistently with the right to life
enshrined in Article 11 of the South African Constitution. Article 11,
contended Soobramoney, entitled "everyone requiring life-saving treatment
who is unable to pay for such treatment herself or himself... to have the
treatment provided at a state hospital without charge." 6 In response, the
South African Constitutional Court held:

74. Stated by Justice Chaskalson. Id. 13.
75. Id. 11.
76. Id.114. The judgment of the South African Constitutional Court rejected each of these

arguments.

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 281 2001-2002

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14

This Court has dealt with the right to life in the context of capital
punishment but it has not yet been called upon to decide upon the
parameters of the right to life or its relevance to the positive
obligations imposed on the state under various provisions of the bill
of rights. In India, the Supreme Court has developed ajurisprudence
around the right to life so as to impose positive obligations on the
state in respect of the basic needs of the inhabitants. Whilst Indian
jurisprudence on this subject contains valuable insights it is
important to bear in mind that our Constitution is structured
differently to [sic] the Indian Constitution. Unlike the Indian
Constitution ours deals specifically with the bill ofrights with certain
positive obligations imposed on the state and where it does so, it is
our duty to apply the obligations as formulated by the Constitution
and not to draw inferences that would be inconsistent therewith.""
The South African Constitutional Court distinguished this case from an
Indian Supreme Court precedent in which the patient/claimant (whose
serious head injuries resulted in a brain hemorrhage) had been turned away
from public hospitals that would have otherwise been able to accommodate
him. In the South African Court's view, "the occurrence was sudden, (a fall
from a train), and there was urgency insecuring treatment in order to
stabilize his condition. The treatment was available but denied.""8 In
further distinguishing the Indian case, the South African Constitutional
Court held that while the nature of the welfare state in India had formed the
background context against which the right to health had been construed,

77. Id. 15. Elaborating on the right to life, Justice Sachs noted that "[h]owever the right
to life may come to be defined in South Africa, there is in reality no meaningfiul way in which it
can constitutionally be extended to encompass the right indefinitely to evade death." Id. 57.
78. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 18 (emphasis added).
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in South Africa the "right to medical treatment could not be inferred to
from the nature ofthe state established by the Constitution or from the right
79
to life which it guarantees.
The South African Constitutional Court further observed that Section
27(3) was a right to not be refused emergency medical treatment rather
than an affirmative right to be provided with emergency medical treatment.
Soobramoney, the Court argued, was suffering from chronic renal failure,
which, unlike an emergency, was "an ongoing state of affairs resulting
from a deteriorationof... [his] renalfunction which is incurable."'
Under footnote 10 of the judgment, the South African Constitutional
Court somewhat hints to a fact pattern that might fit the provisions of
Section 27(3). The fact pattern is borrowed from the apartheid era under
which the provision of health services was conditioned on race and led to
a situation in which seriously injured persons were refused access to

79. Id. The South African Constitutional Court thus concluded,
If Section 27(3) were to be construed in accordance with the appellant's
contention it would make it substantially more difficult for the state to fulfill its
primary obligations under sections 27(1) and (2) to provide health services to
"everyone" within its available resources. It would also have the consequence of
prioritizing the treatment of terminal illnesses over other forms of medical care
and would reduce the resources available to the state for purposes such as
preventative health care and medical treatment for persons suffering from
illnesses or bodily infirmities which are not life threatening. In my view, much
clearer language than that used in Section 27(3) would be required tojustify such
a conclusion.
Id.
80. Id. 21 (emphasis added). The South African Constitutional Court further noted that
dialysis treatment was needed two to three times a week. Id Justice Madala concurs with this
conclusion stating that "Section 27(3) envisages a dramatic, sudden situation or event which is
of a passing nature in terms of time. There is some suddenness and at times even an element of
unexpectedness in the concept of 'emergency medical treatment."' Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA
38. Further, Justice Sachs reinforces this view in the following terms:
The special attention given by Section 27(3) to no-refusal of emergency medical
treatment relates to the particular sense of shock to our notions of human
solidarity occasioned by the turning away from hospital of people battered and
bleeding or of those who fall victim to sudden and unexpected collapse. It
provides reassurance to all members of society that accident and emergency
departments will be available to deal with the unforeseeable catastrophes which
could befall any person, anywhere and at any time.

Id. 51.

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 283 2001-2002

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNA77ONAL LAW

[Vol. 14

ambulance services or admission to the nearest or best hospital. 8 This fact
pattern is really one of overt discrimination. The Court seems to proceed
from at least three underlying problematic assumptions here.
First, to invoke Section 27(3), one has to make a claim based on denial
of access to emergency treatment, as opposed to a claim of entitlement to
such treatment. Yet, one can also argue that since Section 27(1) (which is
prefaced by the affirmative clause "everyone has the right to access to") is
not couched in such negative terms; it is open as to whether Section 27(3)
can only be construed in negative terms in all cases at all times. Similarly,
Section 11 (which protects the right to life) is not couched in negative
terms.' Second, the Court proceeds from the underlying assumption that
Section 27(3) can only be invoked where there has been an instance of
overt discrimination based on race, for example. Hence, the Court
proceeded as if Section 27(3) was an anti-discrimination law that amounted
to an equal protection in the provision of emergency treatment. This is a
rather narrow reading of this clause to the extent that it adopts a formal
equality approach to protection of what is really a social economic right. In
other words, the Court reads Section 27(3) as outlawing individualized acts
of overt discrimination such as denial ofemergency treatment based on skin
color.
The result of this narrow construction of Section 27(3) was to exclude
any inquiry into whether the denial of emergency medical treatment, by the
application of a facially non-discriminatory criteria, impacted disempowered
and disenfranchised groups differently. To engage in such an analysis, the
South African Constitutional Court would have had to abandon its
commitment to a formal equality application of Section 27(3) and instead
examine the legacy of apartheid racial privilege and South African social
power. In other words, to give such an inquiry, as opposed to the limited
construction of Section 27(3) it adopted, the South African Constitutional
Court would have had to engage "in a broad-scale inquiry into why jobs,
education, and power, [in this case access to health] are distributed as they
are."8 3 As we have seen, the South African Constitutional Court instead

81. Id. n.1O.

82. Indeed, Justice Madala acknowledges this in his judgment when he observed, in
reference to Section 11, that the "state undoubtedly has a strong interest in protecting and
preserving the life and health of its citizens and to that end must do all in its power to protect and
preserve life." Id. 39.
83. KJMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL., CRrnCAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITNGS THAT

FoRMED THE MovEMENT at xv to xvi (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996).
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limited the scope of its analysis to individual instances of discriminatory
treatment.
Subsequent to Soobramoney's case, the South African Constitutional
Court engaged in a broad scale inquiry into the right of access to housing
in Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom." Here, the
South African Constitutional Court interpreted the requirement that access
to housing includes "reasonable legislative and other measures" under
Section 26(2), first, as a basis to construe measures taken by the
government to realize this right in the social and historical context,85 and
second, in determining the reasonableness of measures the state has
undertaken, as a basis for considering if such measures exclude "a
significant segment of society, 86 who are most desperate.87 To establish
whether the state had satisfied these two requirements, the South African
Constitutional Court extensively reviewed the state's housing program as
an attempt to end apartheid inequities in housing. By contrast, in
Soobramoney, the South African Constitutional Court did not engage in
such an extensive analysis of the state's programs under the right to health,
although in fairness, the Court was only invited to make a determination of
the right to emergency health care.
With the foregoing in mind, it can safely be surmised that a major
problem with the South African Constitutional Court's approach in
Soobramoney was thus one of seeking to achieve consistency between its
decision with the South African Constitution outside the South African
social economic order or, at the very least, Soobramoney's position of
social economic disadvantage. 8 By examining the unreasoned assumptions

84. 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
85. Id. 22,25.
86. Id. 43.
87. Id. 44.
88. The South African Constitutional Court notes, with reference to Soobramoney v.
Minister of Health,
One cannot but have sympathy for the appellant and his family who face the cruel

dilemma of having to impoverish themselves in order to secure the treatment that
the appellant seeks in order to prolong life. The hard and unpalatable fact is that
if the appellant were a wealthy man he would be able to procure such treatment
from private sources; he is not and has to look to the state to provide him with the
treatment. But the state's resourcesare limited and the appellantdoes not meet
the criteriafor admission to the renal dialysisprogramme.
Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA

31 (emphasis added).
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and preconceptions behind this search for internal coherence within its
approach to constitutional interpretation, 9 it becomes apparent just how
difficult it is to reconcile this search for a correct approach to constitutional
interpretation and the empirical reality of citizens in Soobramoney's
position, as well as the larger context of social division and hierarchy based
on race, gender, and class. This misfit between theory and reality is
demonstrated in Soobramoney's failure to persuade the South African
Constitutional Court to rule in his favor by virtue of his inability to secure
renal dialysis other than through state subsidized medical services. Clearly,
the South African Constitutional Court is not oblivious of the empirical
reality, and it does not define it as beyond its scope of constitutional
adjudication. However, it invokes this empirical reality consistently with its
assumptions by referring to the inadequacy of resources to finance public
health, but not the larger empirical reality that is inconsistent with these
assumptions, especially with reference to the systemic social division and
hierarchy in the South African society.o The South African Constitutional
Court's adjudication on the right not to be denied access to emergency
medical attention is thus conducted without reference to broader concerns
such as social justice and socio-economic equality.
Distinguishing the Indian Supreme Court's notion of a welfare state as
a basis of declining relief to Soobramoney evidences the South African
Constitutional Court's evasion of an analogous argument to the effect that
the 1996 South African Constitution was enacted in part to overcome the
legacy of apartheid policies. These policies created social and economic
opportunities that clearly privileged access to facilities such as health to the
white minority and black upper-class. Hence, although the South African
Constitutional Court notes that, consistent with its prior decisions, the
89. For example, the South African Constitutional Court notes that it adopts a purposive
approach,
which calls for a generous interpretation to be given to a right to ensure that
individuals secure the full protection of the bill of rights, but this is not always
the case, and the context may indicate that in order to give effect to the purpose
of a particular provision a narrower or specific meaning shouldbe given to it.
17 (footnotes and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).
90. Hence, the South African Constitutional Court, referring to the fact that Soobramoney,
like many others in his position, observed, "The state has to manage its limited resources in order
to address all these claims. There will be times when this requires it to adopt a holistic approach
Id.

to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the specific needs of particular individuals
within society." Id. 31.
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South African Constitution must be construed in a context "which includes
the history and background"' of its adoption, this does not seem to spring
from commitments to redress socio-economic inequities as embodied in
South Africa's ambitious, but apparently carefully hedged, Reconstruction
and Development Program.' The South African Constitutional Court was
certainly not oblivious ofthis reality, which makes my point here even more
clear. The South African Constitutional Court dealt with this history and
background by placing resource constraints in the foreground, thereby
relegating the socio-economic hierarchy within South Africa to the
background.93 In contrast, the South African Constitutional Court in
Grootboom placed in the foreground, as having its genesis in apartheid
policies, the socio-economic hierarchy and inequality inherent in the
availability and access to housing. Therefore, this approach overshadowed
the resource constraints argument. As a result, the Court in Grootboom
ruled in favor of a landless citizen who had lived with others under
intolerable conditions and whose temporary housing had been brutally
demolished.94 The Grootboom case, therefore, illustrates that if the Court
foregrounds the socio-economic hierarchy and inequality over resource
constraints, it is possible that the Court may arrive at a substantially
different outcome than if it placed resource constraints in the foreground.
This result would overshadow the socio-economic hierarchy and inequality
as it did in Soobramoney.

91. Id. 16.
92. Makau Wa Mutua, Hope and Despairfor a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 70, 90-92 (1997). For a similar take in the international
public health context, see Obijiofor Aginnam, Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap
and Global Health Challenges at Century's Dawn, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 603 (2000)
(critiquing economic globalization for undermining the realization of the right to health by
exacerbating and legitimating socio-economic inequality in developing countries).
93. According to the South African Constitutional Court,
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of
people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high
level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access
to clean water or to adequate health services. These conditions already existed
when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to
transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and
equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these
conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.
Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 8.
94. Gov't. of the Republic of S. Aft. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA
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In Soobramoney, it could be argued that the South Africani
Constitutional Court's references to socio-economic inequities were
mediated through a form of constitutional reasoning that emphasized the
negotiated handover of power in a gradual, as opposed to a radical,
transformation of South Africa's social and economic apartheid system.
Hence, in foregrounding the resource constraints argument, the South
African Constitutional Court accepted undisputed evidence showing that
the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health did not have sufficient money to
cover the costs of services which it provided to the public. The South
African Constitutional Court further noted that there was a "nation-wide
problem and resources [were] stretched in all renal clinics throughout the
' These resource constraints, in the South African Constitutional
land."95
Court's view, justified the operation guidelines for dialysis machines
because they ensured benefits to as many patients as possible." The South
African Constitutional Court noted that these guidelines had not been
challenged as unreasonable or that "they were not applied fairly and
rationally" in determining that Soobramoney was ineligible for enrollment
in the program.97 The South African Constitutional Court, however,
rejected Soobramoney's claim that if the hospital had been open for longer
hours a day, then perhaps he would have had a chance to get dialysis. In
any event, the doctors at the hospital worked overtime in other hospitals so
that they potentially had more time on their hands. In rejecting this claim,
the Court observed that opening the hospital for additional hours would
involve further expense which would put "a great strain on the existing
'
dialysis machines which .-. . [were] already showing signs of wear."98

95. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 24.
96. For example, although the dialysis machines could be used for only sixty patients, they

were being used by eighty-five patients, and Soobramoney's admission to the program would have
jeopardized the use of the program for other patients. Admission to the program was also

restricted to only about thirty percent of those suffering from chronic renal failure since these were
the only patients that were eligible for a kidney transplant. Id. IM4, 25-26.
97. Id. 25.
98. Id. 28. In addition, the South African Constitutional Court noted that the cost of
treating
all persons in South Africa who suffer from chronic renal failure.. .would make
substantial inroads into the health budget. And if this principle were to be
applied to all patients claiming access to expensive medical treatment or
expensive drugs, the health budget would have to be dramatically increased to
the prejudice of other needs which the state has to meet.
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Third, the Court seems to have a very narrow concept of an emergency,
which appears to be limited to traumas such as falling off a train and being
rushed to the emergency room in an ambulance. This is in contrast to
Soobramoney's illness, whose renal failure, the South African
Constitutional Court argued, was an ongoing state of affairs that required
dialysis treatment two or three times a week." In effect, that can be
construed to mean that failure to receive immediate medical attention for
a sudden medical situation such as a heart attack is medically not
comparable to failure to receive renal dialysis. Under this reasoning, as
applied to Section 27(3), terminally ill patients, such as those suffering from
AIDS, do not deserve the same kind oftreatment as would a patient in need
of immediate medical attention as a result of injuries sustained in a road
accident. Further, under the Court's approach, AIDS patients would be
hampered by the fact that, like patients in Soobramoney's position, their
drugs are expensive, and in view of scarcity of resources, it would be too
much to expect this help from the state because it must also meet other
needs.00
Yet, in both Minister ofPublic Works v. Kyalami Ridge Environmental
Ass 'n'0° and Grootboom, °2 the South African Constitutional Court adopted
a less stringent notion of an emergency situation than in Soobramoney.
Remarkably, neither of the two cases involved the interpretation of a
constitutional clause with the word "emergency" as in Soobramoney. In
Kyalami Ridge EnvironmentalAss 'n, floods caused extensive damage to
the home and property of an intervener, Mphedziseni Mukhwevho. °3 As
a result, he was rendered homeless and destitute. He and about three
hundred others relocated to a temporary location where the living
conditions, as described by the Court, were "deplorable."' Mukhwevho
sought an order from the Court requesting that, pursuant to his
constitutional right of access to adequate housing, the state should be
required to give effect to this right by taking reasonable measures to
provide to him with accommodations. 5 In holding in Mukhewevho's
Id.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
residents

Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 21.
Id. 28.
2001 CCT 55/00.
2001 (1) SA 46.
Kyalami, CCT 55/00, 1.
Id. 29.
Id. 19. The temporary accommodations set aside by the government were at issue after
challenged the decision of the government to locate flood victims in the area because,
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favor, the Court described the deplorable conditions in which he was living
an "emergency." Justice Chaskalson ruled
that [t]he constitutional rights of the flood victims and the
corresponding obligations on the government are clearly relevant to
any consent that may be required for the development to take place.
The government must, however, discharge its constitutional
obligations lawfully. If the law requires it to secure such consent it
must seek and obtain it, or pass legislation that either exempts it
from the provisions of such legislation, or enable it to override its
provisions in cases of emergency.'°6
Clearly, the Court's notion of an emergency here is much broader than
that adopted in Soobramoney. As in Grootboom, in another case on the
right to housing, the South African Constitutional Court constantly referred
to the appellant, who had been forcibly evicted from a temporary abode on
private property, and who subsequently lived in deplorable conditions like
Mukhwevho's, as being in "desperate need, living in crisis and as being in
a crisis situation."' 7 These situations are clearly analogous to
Soobramoney's position, but it is not clear why those with HIV or
conditions like Soobramoney's, who require renal dialysis to prolong life,
should not be regarded as any more desperate or in need of emergency care
like those who had lost their shelter in the two cases referred to here.
Perhaps that is why Justice Albie Sachs observed, while on tour in the
United States last year, that the outcome in Soobramoneywas a formula for
selection for access to expensive medical treatment in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner rather than as a platform upon which the state
could avoid its constitutional obligations. The death of Soobramoney two
days after the Court's judgment had fueled the sense that it was the latter
rather than the former that had tilted the outcome of the case.' In these
remarks made before the Grootboomcase, Justice Sachs seemed to suggest
that the Grootboom case might be decided differently than Soobramoney.

among other reasons, the residents were not consulted prior to the relocation and such a relocation
would result in environmental destruction. See id. 9 7-16.
106. Id. 115 (emphasis added).
107. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA
52, 56, 60, 62, 64, 65.
108. Justice Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable?,53
SMU L. REv. 1386 (2000).
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There is a striking feature in Soobramoney that indicates Justice Sachs'
attempt to base the decision on grounds besides resource constraints with
a view to perhaps preempt some of the criticisms the South African
Constitutional Court may have sensed for declining Soobramoney relief.'° 9
According to Justice Sachs,
Health care rights by their very nature have to be considered not
only in a traditional legal context structured around the ideas of
human autonomy but in a new analyticalframework based on the
notion of interdependence. A healthy life depends upon social
interdependence:the quality ofair,water, andsanitationwhich the
state maintainsfor the public good; the quality of one's caring
relationships,which are highly correlatedto health; as well as the
quality of health care and supportfurnished officially by medical
institutions and provided informally by family, friends, and the
community."'
Here, Justice Sachs seeks to lay a legal basis for the decision on what he
terms as the relational character of human interdependence. On this view,
when rights are shared and are interdependent, balances between equally
valid rights claims must be made. This defines the "circumstances in which
the rights may most fairly and effectively be enjoyed.""' By invoking the
relational character of rights, Justice Sachs characterizes rights as
embedded in a social matrix rather than as abstract and absolute individual
entitlements that trump conflicting interests. Indeed, as Justice Sachs
argued, health care rights "by their very nature have to be considered not
only in a traditional legal context ... but in a new analyticalframework
basedon the notion ofhuman interdependence.""' 2 However, as described
by the Court, this truism about the functional relationship that rights create
is an inaccurate description of health care rights. It seems ingenious on the
part of Justice Sachs to re-describe the entire legal foundation of Justice
Chaskalson's majority decision on the basis of the relational character of
rights. Thus, while it is true that property rights create correlative duties,
since the right to exclusive ownership is balanced with the rights of

109. He refers to this as the "toll of the bell of lack of resources," which is a quote from an
English case. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA 52.
110. Id. 54 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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neighbors to their privacy and of the duty of care the owner of the property
has to the neighbors," 3 in the context of emergency health care, the Court
rules out the existence of such a similar scheme of related rights. This is
because the Court's judgment is exceptionally devoted to justifying the
non-existence of a general right to emergency health care other than in the
narrow confines of denial of emergency care in a dramatic emergency
scenario such as that involving a road accident.
By contrast, a denial of life-support such as renal dialysis creates no
enforceable right as long as the state has limited resources. Such a narrow
reading of Section 27(3) is confirmed in Justice Chaskalson's judgment to
the effect that although the Constitution guarantees every citizen
fundamental rights, "[s]ome rights in the Constitution are the ideal and
something to be strivedfor. They amount to apromise, in some cases, and
an indicationof what a democraticsociety aimingto salvage lost dignity,
freedom and equality should embark upon."' 4 Justice Chaskalson argues

that Section 27(3) is an ideal or aspirational right. Further, he qualifies
Section 27(3) as noted above by arguing that it is a negative as opposed to
a positive right in that it obligates only the government to not deny
emergency medical treatment." 5
The upshot of my observation is simple; Justice Sachs transposes the
notion of the relational or functional nature of rights in a context where
there are no correlative claims since there is no duty incumbent on the state
or anyone to provide health care rights under the Court's analysis.
Perhaps what Justice Sachs was correctly referring to is the fact that, in
the absence of state support of health care, the burden falls to the
household level and onto the relatives and community of those who cannot
afford private health care. If indeed this is what Justice Sachs had in mind,
it has little to do with a formal legal obligation or rights and instead more
to do with the nature of social and moral virtue in South African society.
The virtues of caring for the sick and needy are undeniably part of the fabric
of South African society, but these are not legal or constitutional
entitlements. It is thus quite a stretch for Justice Sachs to suggest that
Section 27 of the Constitution contemplated or presupposed that families
and communities would supplement the government's subsidization of
113. See Part IV (b) of the text.
114. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, 1998 (1) SA 43 (emphasis added).
115. Similarly, Justice Yacoob in Gov't ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa v. Grootboom, 2001
(1) SA 88, observes that "the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Constitution burdens the state
with at least a negative obligation in relation to housing."
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health care. Therefore, Justice Sachs' attempt to suggest that Section 27
presupposes that the lack of resources in provisioning health care "officially
by medical institutions" should be supplemented or "provided informally by
family friends and the community" ' 6 is to read into the Constitution a social
fact that has no underlying constitutional basis.
In fact, Justice Sachs goes beyond the analysis of either Justices
Chaskalson and Madala by observing that courts
are not the place to resolve the agonizing personal and medical
problems that underlie these choices [of life and death]. Our
country's legal system "cannot replace the more intimate struggle
caring for the patient, and
that must be borne by the patient, ' those
17
those who care about the patient." "
Justice Sachs' otherwise apt observation here about care-giving, especially
in the context of terminally-ill patients, suggests that the South African
Constitution contemplates that such care-giving merely involves choices to
be made by "those caring for the patient, and those who care about the
patient.'' 8 Obviously, such a view again presupposes that care-giving
belongs at the household level rather than at a more macro-level such as the
state. Once Justice Sachs locates care-giving or what he terms as the
"agonizing personal and medical" problems to the private sphere of
individual choice as distinct from the public sphere established under "our
country's legal" system, he implicitly displaces a constitutional
responsibility on the part of the state for care-giving where an indigent
citizen's family can provide it. 9 This, in his view, is necessitated by the fact
that the public sphere of official health care is encumbered by "institutional
incapacity" which in turn calls for "appropriate constitutional modesty,"'"2
factors which require the Court to be cautious.' 2' In this summation, Sachs
seems to rather directly suggest that once the state is unable to provide
medical and health services, the state's obligations are exhausted and caregiving becomes a matter of individual choice at the household level.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA
Id. 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA

54 (emphasis added).

58.
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Unfortunately, this view of the household level as the failback or default
position for care-giving aligns rather perfectly with economic reformers'
views. Reformers justify the reallocation of resources by reducing state
provisioning of care-giving to more productive spheres in the formal
economy. This burdens caregivers, particularly women, at the household
level as the state withdraws from programs of public assistance such as
health care.'22 The assumption of these economic reformers is that the
reallocation of resources away from social spending is efficient if these
resources are shifted to managers and corporations, since they are more
productive and efficient. The-household level is thus perceived as inefficient
for productive purposes. So too perceived under the assumptions of this
model of economic growth are the reproductive roles of women, their caregiving, and household work.' 23 This model of economic growth relegates
care-giving to the family while the state and the market service the formal
economy on the premise that economic growth will benefit the household
level through the trickle down effect of new employment and other
opportunities. Justice Sachs' judgment can thus be seen to be clearly,
though unintentionally, aligned with this withdrawal of direct social support
for human needs from the state and the reallocation of those resources to
owners and managers of capital. The default position is thus that the
household level is burdened with care-giving. Unfortunately, state support
for care-giving under this model of economic growth is conceived as

122. Danilo Turk refers to thejustification in structural adjustment programs to the effect that
shifting resources from programs like health and education to other development goals is thought
to be more productive. The Realization of Economic, Social and CulturalRights: FinalReport
Submitted by Danilo Turk, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 44th Sess., Provisional Agenda
Item 8, at 57, 58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (1992). Similarly, in countries where large
sections of the population are already living in poverty, the
[I]ack of education and low literacy rates make information less accessible. Once
HIV becomes established, all these problems are intensified as sickness reduces
the capacity of adults to work or to cultivate what land they have. As household
poverty deepens, girls are taken out of school, women are forced into prostitution,
and children are orphaned, reducing further their chances for education.
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Note by the Secretariat, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 10, at 28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/51 (2000), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/42e49accdf28dd7c802568950055f30
b?Opendocument.
123. Martha Albertson Fineman, CrackingFoundationalMyths: Independence,Autonomy,
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (2000); Martha T. McCluskey,
SubsidizedLives and the Ideology ofEfficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 115 (2000).
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antithetical to market-led growth through the formal economy. It thereby
further marginalizes the reproductive sphere of the household and caregiving by permitting the state to withdraw from subsidizing or allocating
resources to it in the same way it does to capital and managers in the formal
(or so called productive) economy.'24
Following the adoption of the TRIPS agreement after the Uruguay
Round in 1994, in addition to the challenges of using the rights framework,
the delivery of AIDS drugs is also an issue of international trade. Given that
AIDS, like human rights and environmental issues, is a social claim within
the context of the WTO, below I explore how social claims have stacked
up against trade concerns in the approximately fifty-year history of the
international trading framework.
III. THE PLACE OF SOCIAL POLICY IN POST-SECOND WORLD WAR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Social issues have not been well-received by international economic
governance structures since the Second World War. TRIPS continues this
tradition. In this part of the Article, I examine the history of the social
policy's place in the post-Second World War international institutional
compromise. In so doing, I demonstrate that the difficulties of construing
or framing TRIPS in raising public health issues are deeply embedded in the
internal logic of international economic governance.

124. As Kerry Rittich observes,
[n]otwithstanding this interconstitutive relationship between production and
reproduction, the family and the marker, restructuring proposals in the agenda
proceed largely in the absence of any discussion of the expected impact on the
household level or the family. In part, this is a function of development and.
macroeconomic indices which are employed. The exclusion of household and
reproductive labor from the calculus of economic activity creates both an inability
to capture such effects such as increased responsibilities and work intensification
in the reproductive sphere, as well as an incentive to pursue strategies which
require households and individuals to absorb the costs of resource allocation.
Recharacterizing Restructuring: Gender and Distribution in the Legal Structure of Market Reform
61 (1998) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with author).
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A. HistoricalContext
In the post-Second World War institutional compromise, the place of
social policy in the context of international economic institutions has been
ambiguous. There is a classical, or traditional, view and there is a modem
view. In the context of IPRs, the commodity view fits neatly into the
classical or traditional view, while the public policy conception of IPRs fits
into the modem view of the place of social policy in international economic
governance.
Under the classical view, international economic institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, identify
themselves as private as opposed to public institutions. In this universe of
international institutions formed following the Second World War, the U.N.
is thought of as the public counterpart of the IMF, the World Bank, and the
WTO. The public mandate of the U.N. is to secure international peace and
security. The mandates of the IMF and the World Bank are economic as
opposed to political.' The U.N.' s role was designated as political because
its role is to avoid war and maintain international security.
This post-Second World War settlement between public and private
international institutions was not accidental, rather it was the result of
conscious design by architects who wanted to safeguard the international
economy from the whims of politicians. In the view of these architects,
politicians had endangered the international economy in the period
following the First World War by interfering with exchange rates and
imposing high tariffbarriers. Hence, it was necessary to impose restrictions
on political influence over the international economy by placing power into
26
the hands of technocrats.

This dichotomy between public and private mandates is embodied in the
Articles of Agreement of both the World Bank and IMF. The Articles of
Agreement of the World Bank, for example, provide that "[t]he Bank and
its officers shall not interfere in the politicalaffairs of any member; nor
shall they be influenced in their decisions by the politicalcharacterof the
member or members concerned Only economic considerationsshall be
relevant to their decisions, and these considerationsshall be weighed

125. See Good Governance,supra note 59, at 149.
126. For an excellent review of this school of thought, see generally Nathaniel Berman,
Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Economic Consequences,

Nationalist Passions:Keynes, Crisis, Culture and Policy, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 619
(1995).
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impartially.... "127 The IMF's Articles of Agreement have been interpreted
as providing a2 similar prohibition of engagement in the political affairs of
its members. 1
There is precedent in the history of the World Bank's operations
suggesting that it will not comply with decisions of U.N. bodies on
questions of international human rights involving peace and security. In this
precedent, the World Bank declined to follow General Assembly and
Security Council resolutions calling for the suspension of lending to South
Africa and Portugal in 1969.129 The U.N. resolutions were prompted by
Portugal's continuation of its colonial policy in Africa and South Africa's
continuation of its apartheid policies, both of which were determined by the

U.N. to constitute threats to international peace and security. "° The World
Bank adopted this position notwithstanding the fact that its Relationship
Agreement with the U.N. provided for the World Bank to have due regard
to Security Council resolutions. 3 '
Consequently, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the position adopted
by the World Bank's senior management on the role of the World Bank in

127. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Dec. 27, 1945, art. IV, § 10, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 158 (1947) (emphasis added). Article III, Section
5(b) provides that "[tihe Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan
are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to
considerationsof economy and efficiency and without regardtopoliticalor other non-economic
influences or considerations."Id. art. III, § 5(b) (emphasis added).
128. Joseph Gold, PoliticalConsiderationsAre Prohibitedby Articles ofAgreement When
the Fund ConsidersRequests for Use of Resources, IMF SURVEY, May 23, 1983, at 146-48.
129. Samuel A. Bleicher, UN. v. IPRD: A Dilemma ofFunctionalism,24 INT'L ORG. 31,31
(1970).
130. Id.
131. Under Article I, Section 2 of that agreement: "By reason of the nature of its international
responsibilities and the terms of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank is, and is required to function
as, an independent international organization." Agreement between the United Nations and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Nov. 15, 1947, art. 1, § 2, 16 U.N.T.S.
346 (1948). However, Article VI, Section I provides that
the Bank takes note of the obligation assumed, under paragraph 2 of Article 48
of the United Nations Charter ... to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council through their action in the appropriate specialized agencies ofwhich they
are members, and will, in the conduct of its activities, have due regardfor
decisions of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations
Charter.
Id. art. VI, § I (emphasis added).
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relation to the International Bill of Human Rights'3 2 faced serious scrutiny
from critics of World Bank-supported development projects. 33
' Simply put,
this position held that the World Bank's Articles of Agreement did not
provide sufficient institutional elasticity to accommodate a larger role and
responsibility for claims such as human rights. Under this view, social
policy in the context of internationally-protected guarantees of human
rights was outside the World Bank's financial and economic mandate. The
World Bank's role in human rights during that period is analogous to the
position that today, the WTO is isolated from the rest of public
international law.
At the World Bank General Counsel's office, the objectives of the
International Bill of Rights were seen as contradictory to the World Bank's
financial and economic mandate under its Articles of Agreement.' 34 This
position, adopted by the General Counsel's Office, is the traditional or
classical position. However, the continued tenability ofthe position that the
World Bank's mandate is insufficiently flexible to accommodate what are
represented as political and social objectives outside the scope of its
mandate has faced innumerable and sustained challenges. The World Bank
has since redescribed or modernized its mandate in response to various
challenges and responses to this classical position.
The redescription of the World Bank's mandate that occurred in the
1990s can be described as follows. The World Bank General Counsel's
Office, departing from previous interpretations, acknowledged that the
World Bank's economic and financial mandate accommodates elements of
the International Bill of Human Rights. The World Bank's good
governance policy, which combines economic and political conditionality,
was the avenue through which elements of the International Bill of Human
Rights became a part of the World Bank's mandate. Under this
reinterpretation of its mandate, the World Bank took the view that it can
take into account "pervasive violations of [human] rights to the extent that
they have obvious and significant effects on the economy of the country it

132. The International Bill of Human Rights is the core instrument of human rights law. It
is comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and the International
Strategy to Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479, 502 (1999).
133. See Good Governance, supra note 59, at 137.
134. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal
Issues and the Record ofAchievements, 17 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 39, 39 (1988).
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assists." '35 Therefore, human rights goals cannot be achieved at the cost of
36
the World Bank's economic and financial mandate.
This reconstruction ofthe World Bank's mandate to incorporate human
rights is, in my view, not a story of progress and evolution from the
classical to the modem position. 37 Instead, it is my view that both the
World Bank's Articles of Agreement and the International Bill of Human
Rights provide a sufficiently open-ended interpretive arena for the
continued redefinition of the role of the World Bank with respect to human
rights. This possibility of ambiguity in interpreting and reinterpreting the
World Bank's Articles of Agreement and the International Bill of Human
Rights simultaneously empowers and disempowers those involved in this
3
interpretive and strategic work as each side constructs its case. 1
Consequently, human rights activists who support a larger role for the
World Bank in the protection of human rights have their goals constantly
redefined by reference to the World Bank's invocation of its classical
position. It is this strategic engagement of rights work that has a
disempowering effect on human rights activism, as rights claims have to be
redefined or reconciled by finding complementarity and compatibility with
the economic policies of the World Bank. Consequently, human rights
activists, who have sought to use human rights as a means of demanding
that the World Bank adopt an approach to development that is more
humane, are constantly disappointed by the continued redefinition of their
rights claims with countervailing rights claims, which are all mediated
through reference to the background assumptions of the classical
interpretation of the World Bank's mandate. 3

135. Ibrahim Shihata, Democracy and Development, 46 INT'L&COMP. L.Q. 635,640 (1997).
136. Good Governance, supra note 59, at 107.
137. Indeed, as Roberto Unger noted, "We have no stake in finding a preestablished harmony
between moral compulsions and institutional constraints. We know, moreover, that the received
views of institutional propriety count for little except as arguments to use against those who depart
too far from professional consensus." ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STuDIEs MOVEMENT 19 (1983).
138. See generally Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for
Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419 (2000) (arguing

that legal norms used in determining arbitration disputes are open-ended and therefore could be
used for or against third world/first world positions).
139. For a good summary of this argument, see James Thuo Gathii, Human Rights, the World
Bankandthe Washington Consensus: 1949-1999, in AMERICAN SOCIETYOF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 94Tm ANNUAL MEETING 144 (2000).
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B. An Ambiguous Legacy on Social Issues Shapes Up at the WTO:
A Built-in Problem
The place of social issues at the WTO, in my view, reflects the same
ambiguity that characterizes the World Bank's mandate relative to human
rights. At the WTO, there are, of course, the classicists, who are selfdefined as constitutionalists. In the view of the constitutionalists, the WTO
is a self-contained institution separate from public international law and,
therefore, from social claims such as labor rights."4 This view is given
credibility by the fact that GATT, unlike the Articles of Agreement of the
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which established
the World Bank, has been widely regarded as a contract rather than a
treaty. 4' Then there is a countervailing view, which argues that the WTO' s
mandate cannot be understood outside the context of public international

law.142
These two opposing views of the WTO's mandate are unsurprising
given that other international economic institutions, such as the World
Bank, already face the same legacy of ambiguity in accommodating social
policy as part of their self-described economic and financial mandates.' 43 It
is unsurprising for two reasons. First, the WTO has adopted a legal and
institutional architecture that, like the Bretton Woods institutions,
bifurcates its private mandate from its public mandate. Its mandate as a

140. See generallyJeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death ofthe TradeRegime, 10EUR.J. INT'LL. 733

(1999) (arguing that, given the institutional constraints facing the WTO panels and the contested
nature of issues falling outside the scope of the WTO, these social claims should be excluded from
the WTO because they risk delegitimizing WTO procedures); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and:"
Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship -

and Their Surprising Political

Implications, 17 NW. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 759, 763-68 (1996-97) (raising concerns about the trade
regimes expansion into new substantive areas).
141. See David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1994)
(summarizing this view of GATT as a vision of a"decentralized scheme of interstate bargaining");
Donald M. McRae, The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of

InternationalLaw, in RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 178 (1996) (describing the view that GATT was a contract and not a
treaty, and that "[uinlike other international organizations which surrounded themselves with
lawyers, lawyers were notably absent from GAIT, indeed they were often not welcome, and the
role of law in dealing with the economic relations of states was controversial").
142. See generallyDavid Palmeter & Petros C. Mavriodis, The WTO LegalSystem: Sources
of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398 (1998). Similarly, Donald McRae has argued that "it is clear that
at least with the advent of the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism, international law is
central to the interpretation of international trade law." McRae, supra note 141, at 176-77.
143. See James Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizingthe Social in the Constitutionalizationofthe
WTO: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 7 WIDENER L. SyMw. J. 137.
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private international economic institution in lowering trade barriers can only
be limited in exceptional instances that are defined in part under Article XX
of GATT.'" This bifurcation between private and public roles and the
restrictions on departures from what was conceived as a private mandate
are the outcome of the post-Second World War institutional compromise
separating international governance into separate realms public and private.
Yet, this post-Second World War institutional compromise, which is
nothing but an accidental constellation of ad hoc responses to events
leading to the Second World War, continues to influence international
economic governance today. It is therefore plausible to argue that the
ambiguous legacy of social issues in the context of international economic
institutions is not inevitable, but rather the outcome of the conscious
construction of its architects confined within a legal framework that
predetermines such an outcome.
One of the primary ways in which GATT has been defined as having a
limited social agenda is through the restrictive interpretations of the
exceptions listed in Article XX. 45 Article XX potentially allows the
balancing of social objectives, such as public health and protection of the
environment on the one hand, and free trade on the other. However, that
balance has been illusory. For example, in the Tuna Dolphin Case 14 the
issue was whether the United States could extend its environmental policy
of dolphin protection extra-territorially by banning imports of tuna that had
been harvested in violation ofvague limits on dolphin intake.' 47The United
Statesjustified its import ban on the basis of Article XX(b), which provides
for protection of animal life as a basis for departure from a country's

144. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 4 T.I.A.S. 669,
55 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter GATT].
145. Article XX provides that nothing in the GATT
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures... necessary to protect public morals... necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health; ... relating to the products of prison
labour;.., relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption;.., or... essential to the acquisition or distribution
of products in general or local short supply.
Id.

146. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 155 (1993).
147. Id. 5.1.
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commitment under GATT. 4" In finding against the United States, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) panel noted that "[t]he United
States . . .had not demonstrated that it had exhausted all options
reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives through
measures consistent with the General Agreement, in particular through the
negotiation of international cooperative arrangements.' 49
In the Thai Cigarette Case," ° Thailand argued that its prohibition of
imported cigarettes was justified by the objective of reducing cigarette
smoking to combat harmful health effects among its citizens."' It justified
this prohibition of cigarette importation on the basis of Article XX(b) of
GATT." 2 The ICJ panel found against Thailand, ruling that "a contracting
party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other GATT provisions as
'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d)." 53 Article XX(d) provides an
exemption for measures that a party could reasonably be expected to
employ and that are not inconsistent with other GATT provisions available
to it."54 The ICJ panel provided further limitations on measures taken under
the authority of Article XX(d), requiring that "in cases where a measure
consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available
to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT
provisions.""'
Hence, in both the Thai CigaretteCase and the TunaDolphin Case, the
panel adopted a very restrictive reading of the exceptions under Article XX
of GATT. These rulings, in effect, read out of the treaty limitations on free
trade policies based on public health or related concerns that were
understood to be beyond the scope of GATT's mandate. This restrictive
interpretation requires measures to be consistent with Article XX ifno less
trade-restrictive alternative could be imagined to achieve the policy
56
objectives in question."

148. Id. 3.6(b).
149. Id. 5.28.

150. Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7,
1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991) [hereinafter Thailand Restrictions].
151. Id. 21.

152. Id.
153. Id. 74.
154. Id.

155. Thailand Restrictions, supra note 150, 74.
156. Similarly, in another panel report, a measure was found inconsistent with GATT under
Article XX(d). See United States § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D.
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Another way in which the trading regime has been defined as having
little to do with social claims is through the allegation that it is a selfcontained regime, separate from the rest of public international law. This
position supports the restrictive interpretations of Article XX noted above.
However, following the Shrimp Turtle Case,' there is hope for a new
direction in trade policy, away from the constitutionalist position. 5 " A
central issue in the Shrimp Turtle Case was whether exhaustible resources
defined in Article XX(g) included endangered species.'59 In answering this
question, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) abandoned the notion that the
WTO is a self-contained system."6 It did so by examining the question of
whether an endangered species was an exhaustible resource under Article
XX(g) by reference to international environmental law. 61 The AB, like the
panel below it in the Shrimp Turtle Case, found against the United States
on grounds other than whether or not an environmental policy protecting
turtles fell within the exception provided under Article XX(g). 62 The AB
ruling, in effect, allowed members to take action to protect exhaustible

(36th Supp.), at 345 (1990) [hereinafter Section 337]. The panel ruled "that a contracting party
cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as 'necessary' in terms of
Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could be reasonably expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is also available to it." Id. 5.26. The panel
also found that "in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not
reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available
to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions." Id.
157. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12,
1998, 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp Turtle].
158. Similarly, and perhaps hopefully, the Appellate Body in the GasolineII decision found
that U.S. regulations aimed at reducing emissions of toxic and smog-causing agents from motor
vehicles fell within the provisional justification of Article XX(g). United States - Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603, 626 (1996). However,
it also held that the regulations violated the introductory clauses of Article XX by constituting
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. Id. at 633-34.
159. Shrimp Turtle, supra note 157, at 153-54.
160. See generally ROBERT HOwsE & MAKAU WA MUTUA, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1999).
161. See Shrimp Turtle, supra note 157, at 154-57.
162. The United States's ban on shrimp imports from countries that were not certified as
having turtle-safe shrimping methods was found to be inconsistent with GATT because it violated
the chapeau, or preamble, to Article XX, which prohibits measures applied in a discriminatory
manner. Id. at 165-69.
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natural resources in a manner that would have been found invalid under the
panel rulings in both the Thai Cigarette Case and the Tuna Dolphin
63
Case.1
This enduring tension of the place of social claims in the international
trading regime embodied in the praxis of the GATT/WTO and in the postSecond World War institutional compromise can also be traced to a
disciplinary bias in private international law. This disciplinary bias can be
seen in the definition of private international law as an arena free of
sovereign controls. This vision of a private international law order
comprised of private actors trading across borders without the constraints
of sovereignty has animated scholars as far back as Joseph Story in the
nineteenth century." Similarly, in the period after the Second World War,
Harold Koh has argued that "[i]nternational trade law has lived the four
decades since its curious birth as a legal stepchild, largely unembraced by
its sibling fields of public international law [and] domestic administrative
law.'

165

International economic theorists thus believe that the trading regime is
a private order insulated from public claims or sovereign controls such as
those at issue in the Thai Cigarette Case and the Tuna Dolphin Case.
These cases are aligned with the views of economists such as Wilhelm
Ropke, who advocated a liberal economic order premised on the "largest
possible 'depoliticisation' of the economic sphere."' For Ropke,
depoliticising the economic sphere as such was a safeguard against
socialism. Other scholars in this tradition conceptualized social claims not
as a form of collectivism or socialism, as did Ropke, but as a form of
economic sovereignty that had to be restricted in favor of a rule based on
international economic law. 167 Economic sovereignty under this view was
163. For recent commentary, see generally Virginia Dailey, Comment, Sustainable
Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at the WTO, 9 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L.

L. & POL'Y 331 (2000); Jackson F. Morril, Comment,A Needfor Compliance: The Shrimp Turtle
Case and the Conflict Between the WTO and the United States Court ofInternational Trade, 8

TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413 (2000); Andres Rueda, Note, Tuna, Dolphins, Shrimp and Turtles:
What About Environmental Embargoes Under NAFTA?, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 647
(2000).
164. See generally, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1883).
165. Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Markets ofInternational Trade: A Perspective on the
Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (1987).
166. Wilhelm Ropke, Economic Order and International Law, 86 RECUEIL DES COURS 203,
224, 236 (1954).
167. See, e.g., Georg Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of International
Economic Law, 117 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 31 (1966).
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dismissed as an attempt by developing countries, through efforts such as the
New International Economic Order, 6 ' to extend the political concept of
sovereignty into economic relations where it did not belong. 69 Still others
claim that the trading regime is a liberal constitutional order akin to an
invisible hand under which free trade is maximized under a regime of rulebased, minimal governments.'
Clearly then, the place of social claims in the trading framework has
taken shape within an international economic legal fiamework that displaces
it from the onset. This framework thus only accommodates those
assumptions consistent with this background assumption.' Given that
social issues are conceptualized as falling outside the direct mandate of
international economic governance, the outcomes in the Thai Cigarette
Case and the Tuna Dolphin Case can be understood. Yet, following the
Shrimp Turtle Case, there is clearly a different approach that questions the
isolation of the trading regime from public international law norms such as
human rights and environmental protection.
The purpose of my analysis in this section has been to illustrate that the
tension regarding the place of social issues in international economic
governance is generally a built-in problem. I It is therefore unsurprising
that the provisioning of affordable AIDS medicines to low-end consumers
faces the same challenges in the context of TRIPS as human rights claims
have faced in the context of the Bretton Woods institutions. This built-in

168. The New International Economic Order refers to a movement in the late 1960s and early
1970s for third world sovereignty over the means and ends of development. The movement was
ultimately overshadowed by demand in the late 1970s for international principles governing
development. James C.N. Paul, The United Nationsand the Creationof an InternationalLaw of
Development, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 307, 310-11 (1995).
169. See Norbert Horn, Normative Problems of a New InternationalEconomic Order, 16 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 338, 343 (1982).
170. See generally, e.g., ERNST-ULRICH PETERsMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
FOREIGN TRADE LAW AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND SWITZERLAND (1991).

171. See David Kennedy, The Disciplines of InternationalLaw and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 9, 12-13 (1999) (describing various approaches for identifying bias in law that purports

to be neutral and employing a methodological approach that identifies bias in the deep structure
of law in terms of its disciplinary sensibility to its own internal contradictions and background
assumptions, which preclude it from seeing some things that are not consistent with those
assumptions).
172. See id. (arguing "that a discipline's blindspots, strategies of evasion, elision, or
forgetfulness might be linked to bias of various sorts... [such as] elisions or contradictions
internal to a disciplinary sensibility with external biases.").
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problem arises largely from the dichotomy of private and public
consequences in international economic governance. Public consequences,
such as providing access to affordable AIDS medicines, human rights, and
environmental protection are presumed to be controversial and problematic
given the WTO's mandate of lowering barriers to trade. The pursuit of free
trade, by contrast, is regarded as less controversial because it depoliticizes
international commerce by eliminating sovereign controls over it.
However, the suggestion that private policy goals such as free trade are
apolitical and uncontentious is troubling due to its artificiality. The fallacy
of this distinction is made evident by the assumption that private
international law, as opposed to public law, is apolitical because it does not
depend on sovereign controls, as if the absence of sovereign controls
constitutes neutrality. It is problematic to presuppose that politics is only
found where there are public interventions into civil society (as in
protecting human rights) but not where social claims are made (such as
provisioning of affordable medicines for AIDS patients) within a regime of
private international law - TRIPS. The restrictiveness with which TRIPS
is construed in the context of providing affordable medicines is not merely
the logical apolitical outcome of a private international regime, but the
outcome of a process of making choices between alternative visions of
TRIPS. Making these choices is not any less political than the forms of
economic regulation that are understood as political by WTO
constitutionalists. ' This differs from the vision ofprivate international law
as an apolitical legal arena.

173. Similarly, Adelle Blacket, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and
Treaty Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1999), argues that "social clause
proponents should be thinking less about a negotiated 'clause' grafted onto the existing GATT
framework, and more about a social dimension through treaty interpretation." Id. at 5. Making a
similar point, David M. Trubek, Protectionism and Development: Time For a New Dialogue?, 25
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 345 (1993), stated that "[rlather than seeking exceptions to general
rules, the South may initiate a new dialogue on trade matters by lobbying for greater enforcement
of the basic principles and disciplines the developed countries have officially endorsed." Id. at
364. For the same debate in the context of whether deep integration leaves room for social justice,
see DAVID M. TRUBEK, SOCIAL JUSTICE "AFTER" GLOBALIZATION: THE CASE OF SOCIAL EUROPE
3 (MacArthur Consortium Research Series on International Peace and Cooperation No. 9, 1996).
174. See James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance:
Decenteringthe International Law ofGovernmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996,2024-27
(2000).
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IV. THE DIALECTICAL CHARACTER OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER TRIPS

Based on the foregoing analysis of international economic governance,
it comes as no surprise that TRIPS is based on a private property model
that exhibits two logics in tension with each other.'75 The first of these
logics is that of property as a market commodity. The role of property
under this logic is that of individual preference satisfaction. The underlying
rationale of property rights in the commodity conception is based on a view
of a society of free individuals engaging in maximally free contracts.
Markets operate as utility-maximizing machines, socially optimizing the
aggregate sum of satisfaction with scarce resources through mechanisms of
choice, supply, demand, and price.' 76 In essence, private property rights in
this system are important incentives for high productivity because people
get to keep what they produce. Without property rights, people would
produce less because they would get to keep less. Here, there is no room
for political controls over individual use of property.'
The second logic is a public policy perspective of property rights. Under
this second logic of property, there are circumstances under which property
can be legitimately encumbered with public regulation, for instance to strike
a balance between the interests of producers and consumers of IPRs. This
public policy alternative is embedded in the provisions of the TRIPS
agreement that contemplates a balance between the rights of producers and
consumers of IPRs. It is also implicit in the discretion that TRIPS
presupposes that countries have in implementing the treaty. Hence, for
example, there is no consensus on certain issues such as subject matter of
protection. The status of computer programs and biotechnologies is

175. See generally TRIPS, supra note 5.
176. According to Mark Kelman, it is just an assumption that the actual choices embodied
in contracts and markets reliably reflect what people truly value. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 127-28 (1987). Kelman argues that there is a wide divergence between
choice on the one hand and utility, what people actually value, on the other. Id. If we agree with
Kelman, the regime of free contracts cannot therefore reliably provide us the optimum of what we
actually deem valuable. There are duress and other forms of constraint that limit our choices.
Choice does not reflect value choices such as those related to equality and participatory
democracy, as these kinds of values would provide market choices and legitimacy by maximizing
the similarities rather than the differences between choice and value.
177. For critiques of this protectionist, anti-consumer, pro-industry position, see generally
Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996). See generally Oddi, supra note 3.
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unclear.' 7 ' In addition, the novelty and nonobviousness standards of
eligibility for patents are unclear. 79 All of these unclear areas give
developing countries room to develop practices consistent with their goals.
These areas of discretion also extend to the exact scope of exclusive rights,
as it is unclear whether the doctrine of equivalents applies. 0 Similarly,
there is much discretion afforded in the exceptions that TRIPS allows. For
example, it is unclear whether a country must declare a national health
emergency to invoke compulsory licensing.'
The logic of property as commodity has a central goal of maximizing
returns on investments so that owners of IPRs can receive returns on their
investments and conduct research and development. The rallying cry of the
private sector group that conceptualized the TRIPS agreement came on the
coattails of a fair trade debate in the United States. In the context of IPRs,
the fair trade debate arose as a way of addressing piracy of American and,
in general, Western corporate IPRs in developing and rapidly developing
countries. Although fair trade was the chosen means ofthe advocates ofthe
TRIPS agreement to combat IPR piracy, the true goal of these advocates
in adopting a private property model was to maximize profits and returns
on investment for the purpose of research and development of IPRs.
It is my claim that the commodity conception of IPRs is not the only
vision of private property embedded in the TRIPS agreement. The TRIPS
agreement was seriously debated against a background of at least two
visions in tension with each other on the role of private property in
international society. Under the commodity conception of private property,
TRIPS embodies a form of IPR protection aimed at realizing the maximum
profit possible in the marketplace. Under the alternative view, TRIPS can
be conceptualized as embodying a vision that balances the returns
producers seek for their research and development and the benefits that
IPRs extend to society. Here, the focus is much broader than giving
producers of IPRs the right to realize the maximum profit possible.8 2

178. See Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 97
(2001).
179. See Curtis M. Horton, ProtectingBiodiversityand CulturalDiversityUnderIntellectual
PropertyLaw: Toward a New InternationalSystem, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 27 (1995).
180. The doctrine of equivalents "means that if two devices do the same work in substantially

the same way and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they
differ in name, form, and shape." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 542 (6th ed. 1990).
181. Reichman, supra note 2, at 16-17, 26.

182. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135-36 (1876), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Illinois state government has the power to regulate owners' returns on their businesses, which

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 308 2001-2002

RIGH7S. PATENTS MARKE7S AND THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC

The maximum profit possible view of the commodity conception of
IPRs is justified on the basis that it is only reasonable and fair to
compensate owners of intellectual property for their investment in research
and development. Under this view, those who put their effort, labor, and
capital into the market should get a return or reward for their input, without
the risk of piracy. According to this commodity logic of private property,
producers have an incentive to produce only when these returns are
guaranteed. This view proceeds from a very strong view in favor of the
sanctity of property. This view further justifies intellectual property
protection as a necessary precondition for promoting transfers of
technology to developing countries.
The foregoing view however, understates the invariable tensions that
this commodity logic of private property generates in the context of public
policy. Hence, for example, early in the negotiations on TRIPS and
immediately after it came into force following the Uruguay Round, the
United States was greatly opposed to reading flexibility (or limitations on

trumps private agreements regarding price and limits investment return on private property. This
power, the U.S. Supreme Court held, arose where there was a public interest that justified such
regulation of private property. Id. at 126-27. In other words, where an industry is intertwined with
a public interest, state governments have the power to limit profit. See id The law in question in
Munn was similar to many laws passed in the Midwest at that time to regulate the warehousing
and transportation of grain. See id at 125. Defining grain elevators as public warehouses the
Illinois statute established maximum rates for grain storage. Id at 113-14. In Bluefield Water
Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679,692-93 (1923), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that there is "no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or
anticipated in highly profitable industries." Id. Hence, on the issue of protection of private
property rights, the Court seems to suggest that only a minimum rate of return is constitutionally
required; protection of property rights only has to be reasonable and fair. See id; see also Munn,
94 U.S. at 129. There is an implicit protection of the consumer, to the extent that a fair profit also
entails a fair price to the consumer. See Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 692-93; see also Munn, 94 U.S. at
129. However, note that following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Chicago,Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railway v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), a doctrine shift from Munn occurred. In that
case, the Court invalidated a statute that made railroad rates that a commission had established
without a hearing conclusive in judicial proceedings to enforce them. Such absence of an
investigation, the Court held, was a deprivation of the company's lawful use of its property.
Hence, in Milwaukee, the U.S. Supreme Court departed from Munn in holding that even
businesses affected with a public interest had a due process right to check legislative power to
regulate railroads for reasonableness. Eventually, in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the U.S.
Supreme Court, in holding as unconstitutional a Nebraska statute imposing rate reductions
averaging 29.5% on intrastate shipments, completed its doctrinal shift away from Munn.
Following Smyth, a "corporation's opportunity to realize profits for private benefit, even as to
firms that were licensed to serve the public interest," was raised to a constitutional level. See
GREGORY ALEXANDER,

COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN

AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT

270 (1997).
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IPR protection) into TRIPS. However, there seemed to be a recognition of
the need to be flexible in implementing TRIPS in the last two years. Hence,
in May 2000, President Clinton signed an executive order directing the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) not to impose trade sanctions under section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 or revoke any intellectual property laws or
policies of sub-Saharan African countries related to promoting access to
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies to affected
populations.' Similarly, in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, the U.S.
Supreme Court has stopped short of treating rate regulation as a
deprivation of property without due process.'
Therefore, I argue that there is no single tradition of intellectual
property protection in TRIPS. My claim is that the commodity logic of IPR
protection simultaneously and dialectically co-exists with an alternative
logic of IPR protection that recognizes as legitimate the accommodation of
public policy concerns as falling within the purview of the TRIPS
agreement. In essence, the TRIPS agreement is predicated on an implicit
balance between the interests of producers and consumers of IPRs. 85
One of the reasons that the dialectical character of intellectual property
protection has been understated over the last several years has to do with
the success of the classical economic vision of free markets in shaping the
production of legal doctrine relating to IPRs. I claim that the production of
legal doctrine in the context of TRIPS was also heavily influenced by
discourse about markets and therefore by the commodity view of private
property rights. This free market rhetoric that has characterized debates
about free trade and globalization under the aegis of neo-liberal economics
over the last several years has given the commodity logic of private
property rights enormous credibility while simultaneously de-legitimating
governmental limitations on private property."8 6 Yet, this vision of free
183. Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521, 30,522 (May 12, 2000). This executive
order also required sub-Saharan African countries to provide adequate and effective intellectual
property protection as a precondition for increasing access to HIV/AIDS drugs. Id. at 30,521.
184. In Munn, 94 U.S. at 125, Chief Justice Waite noted that under certain circumstances,
price regulation may constitute a deprivation of property without due process. However, in the
context of pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS agreement, there is no parallel to price deregulation,
especially following the wave of deregulation that has accompanied the wave of globalization
since the late 1980s. See also supranote 182.
185. For a preliminary attempt to articulate this sense of balance in the trading regime in
general, see Gathii, supra note 143.
186. However, as Duncan Kennedy reminds us, the role of law has been simply to transpose
from equally presumptuous economics the "idea of respect for the labor of others" by defining
private property as embodying the legal equivalent or repository of the labor of others. Duncan
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markets with its attendant subscription to a model of property as
commodity is only one of the contending visions of intellectual property
that has characterized debates on the ideal international IPR regime.
Hence, while TRIPS evidences the success of those committed only to
the commodity vision of private property, this vision has been in severe
contention and tension with an alternative vision of IPRs. That alternative
vision is characterized by the assertion that public policy issues such as
human rights, environmentalism, and public health issues like AIDS have
a legitimate place in TRIPS. This tension is partly a reflection of the
significance of seeing the TRIPS regime within the context of prevailing
social, political, and economic circumstances. These circumstances in turn
influence the construction and interpretation of the legal norms of the
TRIPS regime and, as such, produce a tension with the prevalent
commodity conception ofIPRs. ""Seeing TRIPS this way demonstrates the
nature of its built-in public/private dichotomy, which is most evident when
we start considering the policy options and choices it provides for or
forecloses.
In this part, I aim to clarify this tension in the construction and
interpretation of different logics of property under the TRIPS regime. Only
one of the private property logics of TRIPS, the commodity logic, has been
well developed and articulated, while the contending public policy-oriented
perspective has not been articulated as well in the literature.,88

Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34
AM. U. L. REV. 939, 955.(1985). Hence, "[cilassical legal thought conceived the legal system as
designed to guarantee everyone that they could safely embody their labor in commodities and
freely exchange them. This idea was essential to the classical economists' claim that the
distributive process merely compensated economic actors for their labor inputs." Id. at 956.
Further, Kennedy notes that
[c]lassical legal thought supported the classical economists' claim that the
outcome of economic processes was "natural" by showing that state intervention
could be organized in accord with natural law, rather than as a distorting activity.
If all rational men must agree, not only that property was sacred and pactasunt
servanda, but that a code could be deduced from those abstractions, then state
activity in enforcing the code could hardly be described as artificial.
Id.
187. This does not in any way suggest that international legal regimes like TRIPS do not have
an autonomy of their own, independent of prevailing circumstances.
188. Some works with aspirations in this direction include: JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996);
Aoki, supra note 177; Keith Aoki, The Stakes of Intellectual PropertyLaw, in THE POLITICS OF
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The contribution my Article makes in developing a public policyoriented perspective of private property rights is guided by the principle
that private property rights have a social as well as a political character,
apart from their economic character in seeking the highest returns for
owners of private property. Private property is valued not only as an end
and right in and of itself, but also in terms of its social utility, which comes
from political demands such as those related to accessibility and
affordability of IPR protected products that will help to meet public health
needs of low-income individuals. 9
Indeed, it seems that Western governments, which have most
vehemently advocated a commodity logic of intellectual property based on
maximizing profits to producers of IPRs, have in certain cases backtracked. For example, as noted above, the United States has adopted a
policy of allowing sub-Saharan African governments discretion to adopt
laws and policies facilitating access to AIDS drugs without fear of
imposition of sanctions under section 301 ofthe Trade Act of 1974. 9 This,
in addition to the political demands associated with dramatic moments such
as the 1999 Seattle protests, 91 complemented by public policy
constructions and interpretations of the TRIPS agreement, can be
characterized as constituting and indeed beginning to crystallize a public
policy-oriented conception of intellectual property rights.
Similarly, on September 17, 1999, the United States and South Africa
reached a common understanding on the relationship between
pharmaceuticals and public health. 92 While both governments committed
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 259 (David Kairys ed., 1998) [hereinafter Stakes]; Samuel

Murumba, Globalizing Intellectual Property: Linkage and the Challenge of a Justice
Constituency, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 435 (1998); Oddi, supra note 3; Ruth Gana Okediji,
Copyright andPublic Welfare in Global Perspective,7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117 (1999);
Ruth Gana Okediji, Toward an InternationalFair Use Doctrine,39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
75 (2000); Reichman, supra note 2.
189. Joseph William Singer, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF

OWNERSHIP 20 (2000), notes that property law "is highly protective of the prerogatives of owners,
but it also recognizes that ownership may impose vulnerabilities on others and limits the rights
of owners when their actions impinge on the legitimate interests of other."
190. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
191. In November 1999, a diverse group of demonstrators gathered in Seattle to protest the
negative aspects of international trade and globalization during the first WTO Ministerial held in
the United States. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Massachusetts,Burma andthe World Trade Organization:
A Commentary on Blacklists, Federalism,and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era, 34
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 2-3 (2001).

192. Steven Lee Myers, South Africa and US. End Dispute Over Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1999, at A8.
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themselves to the TRIPS agreement, they nevertheless acknowledged the
need to address the AIDS epidemic as a public health emergency. 9"

However, one must also not forget that the planned actions of the United
States with respect to Brazil and Argentina indicate a tendency the other
way.

A. The Commodity Logic of PrivatePropertyEmbodied in TRIPS:
The Backgroundfor Aggressive IPR Protection
The TRIPS agreement evidences the success of a coalition of private,
American high-technology firms in linking intellectual property protection
to trade and to the GATT/WTO framework. This coalition, known as the
Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), was formed in the early 1990s with
two major aims. The first was to make IPR protection a central part of U.S.
foreign trade policy. The second was to use this new prominence of IPR
protection in the domestic foreign trade policy context to improve
international IPR protection, primarily through new internationally-binding
minimum standards that would be adopted in the course of the Uruguay
Round and enforced by the WTO. The strategy of the thirteen member
IPC, 94 under the leadership of then-Pfizer Chairman and CEO Edmund T.
Pratt, was to forge an alliance with European and Japanese high-technology
industries, as well as with the governments in Europe, Japan, and the
United States. Their goal was motivated in part by the desire to gain
leverage in the creation of the GATT/WTO framework under negotiation
in Uruguay and to achieve IPR protection.
A primary impetus behind this privately sponsored initiative was the

shift in the United States's comparative advantage with respect to products
and services with a market value that is greatly dependent on international

intellectual property protection. For example, the value of U.S. exports
produced with IPR protection rose from 9.9% in 1947 to 27.4% in 1986,
a 17.5% percentage point increase in about four decades.'" Given this

193. See id.

194. These thirteen members were: Pfizer, General Electric, Merck, IBM, DuPont, Warner
Communications, Hewlett-Packard, Bristol Myers, FMC Communications, General Motors,
Johnson and Johnson, Monsanto, and Rockwell International.
195. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 4 (R.
Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988). The products measured in 1947 were
chemicals, books, and electrical machinery, while in 1986 they included those items and
computers. Id.
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trend, the new locus of the United States's competitiveness now largely
depends on its capability not only to generate research, software designs,
entertainment, engineering concepts, advertising, marketing, styling, legal,
and financial innovations and information-based inventions, but also to
protect these forms of intellectual property as rights. Such protection would
in turn secure the competitive edge of U.S. intellectual property exports.
However, as a central part of U.S. foreign trade policy, the shift in the
United States's comparative advantage from an advantage solely in terms
of industry, technology, and resources to an advantage in transforming or
producing conceptual notions into intangible flows of ideas and money was
the result of private sector lobbying. The backdrop against which the hightechnology sector in the United States raised the need for more prominence
of IPR protection in foreign trade policy was the debate on fair trade. One
of the rallying cries of the fair trade debate characterized U.S. IPRs as
particularly vulnerable to piracy at the hands ofdeveloping countries. There
was a particular concern regarding countries such as Japan and those of
Southeast Asia, which had achieved dramatic levels of growth based on
imitation and mimicry of the high technology of U.S. corporations. The
following factors fueled the fair trade debate: the trade deficit, especially
with Japan; unemployment losses, which were somewhat directly related to
declining export levels, and lobbying, especially by organized labor."1
This perception further held that foreign competition from Third World
countries had increasingly made it harder for the United States and
developed countries in general to maintain their standards of living, or even
their high rates of economic growth. Japanese growth was an initial impetus
of this perception in the 1980s. These perceptions congealed into claims of
unfairness that propelled U.S. unilateralism and leadership in the Uruguay
Round of GATT. The debate was structured somewhat around the claim
that the United States had progressively opened its border to international
trade without a concurrent reciprocity on the part of its trading partners.

196. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TRADE AND WAGES: A MALIGN RELATIONSHIP (Department of
Economics, Columbia University, Discussion Paper No. 761, 1995) (regarding the complex
relationship between unemployment and international trade). Bhagwati argues that it is not
entirely clear that the low wages in developed countries can easily be accounted for solely by
labor-saving technologies and skills-biased technological changes, and that the effects of
globalization in and of themselves cannot account for the loss of these jobs. Id. However, Dani
Rodrik argues that there is a probable relationship between the loss of labor's bargaining power
in the United States and globalization, because globalization increases the substitution of labor
across national boundaries much easier. See generally DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE
Too FAR? (1997).
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One consequence of the trade debates during this era was the quest by the
United States to pry open foreign markets that had been perceived to have
197
been closed to U.S. commerce.
Edmund Pratt Jr., Chairman and CEO of Pfizer, was, at the time of this
debate and since 1979, a member of President Carter's Advisory
Committee on Trade and Policy Negotiations (ACTPN). The mandate of
this private sector group was to review and to report to Congress on the
policies of the USTR's office, as well as to advise the USTR on trade
policy. As the ACTPN chair from 1981, Pratt led not only the IPC but also
the ACTPN in making IPR protection a central part of U.S. foreign trade
policy. This turned into a remarkable conceptual and policy success.
Conceptually, the acknowledgement of IPRs as a trade issue heralded a
new era of U.S. trade policy, shifting from merely advocating open markets
for trade to actively prying open foreign markets for U.S. goods
(particularly IPRs) while simultaneously seeking aggressive international
legal protections for IPRs in these new markets. It is noteworthy that Pratt
and IBM Chairman John Opel jointly chaired the intellectual task force of
the ACTPN at the time when these changes were taking place.' 8
Another policy success of the ACTPN initiative institutionally was the
formation of a new office of Assistant USTR for International Investment
and Intellectual Property in the early 1980s. Congressional action also
followed suit with significant changes made to the Trade Act of 1974. In
1984, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was amended to authorize the
USTR, without a showing of injury by the industry, to take retaliatory
action against countries failing to give adequate protection to intellectual
protection.' 99 Section 303 was amended to authorize the USTR to report
on barriers to trade in countries throughout the world. °° Section 501 was
197. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see generally AGGRESSIVEUNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T.
Patricks eds., 1990).
198. Some startling statistics from a variety of industries on the losses they had sustained as
a result of lax, inadequate, or non-existent IPR protection in developing countries gave further
impetus to the claims of unfairness. Among the industries that alleged piracy were pharmaceutical
as well as copyright-based industries such as the movie, publishing, and software industries. In
1986, for example, the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that inadequate intellectual
property protection had cost U.S. firms between forty-three and sixty-one billion dollars in 1986
alone. PFIZER: GLOBAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Case No.

9-392-073, 1995).
199. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 301, 98 Stat. 3000 (1984)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
200. See id. § 303(a), 98 Stat. at 3001-02 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2241 (2001)).
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amended to authorize the President to consider the adequacy of intellectual
property protection in'deciding whether a developing country should be
granted tariff preferences under the United States Generalized System of
Preferences.2 '
In 1988, the Trade Act of 1974 was further amended by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, through the passage of Special
301.202 Special 301 is a unilateral trade power that requires the USTR to
identify foreign states denying intellectual property protection to U.S. firms
and to designate the most important of these as "Priority Foreign
Countries. ' 20 3 The designation of a country under the priority list requires
the USTR to initiate an investigation within thirty days to determine
whether the foreign practices involved violated U.S. rights under a trade
agreement or were unreasonable or discriminatory. 2 '4 The enhancement of
the USTR's jurisdiction, as well as the unilateral jurisdiction of the United
States that was apparent on the face of these amendments, reflected a major
policy shift of U.S. trade policy towards retaliation rather than reciprocity
in securing foreign markets for U.S. goods and services.
The increased authority of the USTR in the area of IPRs in turn laid the
stage for the United States to unilaterally single out countries opposed to
the TRIPS agreement for punitive action unless they complied with U.S.
law. The threat of unilateral sanction was also used to push developing
countries to support TRIPS at the Uruguay Round. The countries placed
on the Priority Watch List in 1989 in this effort included India, Brazil,
Taiwan, and Thailand, which all opposed the inclusion of IPR protection in
the Uruguay Round in general and TRIPS in particular. The actions against
Brazil and India, two of the biggest members of the developing country
coalition, a group of seventy-seven countries, played a major role in
splitting the coalition and in securing acquiescence to TRIPS by developing
countries.
In 1988, the IPC issued its "Basic Framework" document, which
embodied the outlines of the TRIPS agreement. 2 5 Building consensus with
European governments and corporations was problematic, especially in
201. See id.§ 501, 98 Stat. at 3001-02 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465
(2001)).
202. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (2001).
203. See id. § 2242(a).
204. Id. § 2412(b)(2)(A).
205. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE ET AL., BASIC FRAMEWORK OF

GATT PROVISIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY -

A STATEMENT OF THE VIEWS OF THE

EUROPEAN, JAPANESE, AND UNITED STATES BUSINESS COMMUNITIES (1988).
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view of the emerging tendency towards U.S. unilateralism. European
countries, for example, were inclined towards a multilateral approach that
embodied considerations such as special and differential treatment for their
former colonies. The European Union member countries and industries
wanted a Code on Intellectual Property Rights that would eventually
become a part of GATT.
The American-led IPC wanted a system of intellectual property
protection that was binding on all nations, not only those that had ratified
such a Code, as had been the practice under similar GATT codes. The
Japanese government and Japanese industry, like their European
counterparts, were reluctant to proceed with the IPC's proposals. To
overcome these hurdles to an IPR agreement, the IPC used its relationship
with the U.S. federal trade establishment to increase bilateral pressures
through the enhanced powers under Section 301, among others. In
addition, the IPC suggested that the United States should condition debt
forgiveness to Latin American countries on adequate patent protection.
The bilateral pressures of the United States, which were based primarily
on its unilateral retaliatory powers, were critical in leveling opposition to
TRIPS in the Uruguay Round Working Group on Intellectual Property.
Whereas the IPC's basic framework did not anticipate all the differences the
United States, the European Union, and Japan haggled over during the
Uruguay Round, it undoubtedly put IPRs on the international trade agenda.
The success of industry in making IPRs a part of the GATT/WTO
framework is evident in the definition of IPRs.
The industry's success in bringing IPRs to the WTO was further
enhanced by the United States's conditional acceptance of the Uruguay
Round agreements on the acknowledgment of its unilateral power under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. Consequently, the
United States has reserved the authority to enforce the Uruguay
Agreements where members of the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding did not comply with their obligations at the end of the
dispute settlement process.2"

206. A WTO panel has found that sections 301-3 10 of the Trade Act of 1974 are consistent
with the United States's obligations under the WTO. United States-Sections 301-3 10 of Trade
Act of 1974, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS I 52/R (99-5454) (1999). At the 2000 Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (ASIL), Robert Howse argued that this decision was
consistent with international legal principles allowing countries to engage in unilateral actions in
their foreign relations as set out in Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
However, Petros Mavriodis argued that this case raised the possibility that the panel was mistaken
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TRIPS is unprecedented because it is the first international treaty to
embody a regime of private rights with minimal attention to the underlying
public policy issues underlying IPR protection. Traditionally, trade and
economic treaties have created rights for private parties indirectly through
their respective public authorities. However, TRIPS departs from this norm
by providing an elaborate international private law regime with remedies
such as injunctive remedies,2"7 border measures against counterfeiting,20 8
and penalties for infringement. °9
TRIPS is also unique in the way it has influenced and will continue to
influence distributional benefits disproportionately in favor of Western or,
at the very least, large corporations with enormous resources, which have
the necessary expertise to take advantage of its provisions.2 0 One of the
most significant ways in which TRIPS narrows distributional gains is by its
overwhelming reliance on a notion of original authorship. Hence, through
a conceptual shift, science, commerce, and research are re-constituted
solely as information, as opposed to being appreciated for their underlying
value as scientific, commercial and educational resources, and the
knowledge that they bring. For example, TRIPS protects control over
expressions rather than ideas.21' Similarly, it protects the information value
contained in patents rather than inventions that have been reduced to
practice. 22122 Trademarks have similarly expanded the scope of exclusive
control over marketplace signals in commerce, thereby departing from their
signaling function in the marketplace. 3
This conceptual shift towards original authorship in turn leads to the
under-protection and under-appreciation of indigenous knowledge, culture,

to the extent that section 23 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding is the cornerstone of the
multilateral system of dispute settlement at the WTO.
207. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 44.
208. Id. arts. 51-60.
209. Id. art. 46.
210. To take one small example that has potential to weigh heavily in favor of Western
multinationals, the TRIPS agreement adopts a first-to-file as opposed to a first-to-invent system
for determining IPR protection. This seemingly insignificant change favors "large corporate
research and development departments with staffs of patent lawyers working on time consuming
and complex patent applications." Stakes, supra note 188, at 271.
211. See TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 9 § 2.
212. See id. art. 27.
213. See id. arts. 15-21.
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dances, artifacts, and physical resources. 4 Hence, where indigenous
knowledge forms the basis for new pharmaceutical products, such
indigenous knowledge is uncompensated because it is regarded as merely
being raw material, which only acquires IPR value once it is transformed by
scientific intervention. This shift in terms of conceiving forms ofknowledge
as information heavily favors the Western industrialized countries in
general, and owners of technologies in those countries in particular, as they
hold the industrial, technological, and resource advantage in transforming
or producing conceptual notions into intangible flows of ideas and money.
Yet, while the significance of the medium grows, the product cost
devoted to producing the medium drops; however, that savings in cost of
production is not passed on to the consumer. Hence, as the price of
producing a diskette or even a drug drops, the price of the diskette or of
licensing the patent for it grows under the regime created by TRIPS. 215 The
exclusivity of control of information under the TRIPS regime, contrary to
the notions of its most ardent supporters, will therefore "diminish the
availability of our cultural heritage, inhibit artistic innovation, and restrict
public debate and free speech" in a manner that will undermine innovation
and scientific progress. 6

214. For an inquiry into this issue, see Ruth L. Gana Okediji, Has Creativity Died in the
Third World? Some Implications of the Internationalizationof Intellectual Property, 24 DENV.
i. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 125-37 (1995).
215. BOYLE, supra note 188, at 7.
216. Id. at 124-25; see also WILLIAM ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INCHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995) (arguing that Chinese history
undermines the thesis that there is a historical correlation between economic development and
respect for intellectual property rights); William Alford, How Theory Does - And Does Not Matter: American Approaches to Intellectual PropertyLaw in EastAsia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 8, 16-19 (1994); Bhupinder S.Chimni, The PhilosophyofPatents:StrongRegime Unjustified,
52 J.SC. & INDUS. RES. 234, 234-39 (1993) (questioning the idea that a hard notion of property
rights is necessarily consistent with higher productivity). According to Alford, intellectual property
rights cannot be implemented successfully in isolation from other rights. Hence, he suggests that
concerns about human rights are indispensable to the attainment of intellectual property
protection. He bases this view on the premise that serious copyright protection depends upon
political and economic pluralism and independent legal institutions capable of vigorously
enforcing citizens' rights. Alford, supra, at 18.
Even Friedrich A. von Hayek, the conservative free market commentator, has expressed
skeptical views on the relationship between large investments in research and development, which
should justify increased levels of IP protection on the one hand and innovation on the other.
According to Hayek, "recurrent re-examinations of the problem [of intellectual property] have not
demonstrated that the obtainability of patents of invention actually enhances the flow of new
technical knowledge rather than leading to wasteful concentration of research on problems whose
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B. The PublicPolicy-OrientedLogic of IntellectualPropertyRights
A public policy conception stands in tension with the commodity logic
of IPRs in TRIPS. Although this public policy oriented conception of IPRs
is overshadowed by the prevalence of the commodity conception in
commentary on TRIPS, it nevertheless co-exists with the commodity
conception. One central tension between the commodity and public policy
conceptions of IPRs is as follows: the commodity oriented impulse towards
the liberty interest of producers of IPRs to realize profits on the one hand
is in tension with the interests of consumers of IPRs in receiving a fair price
and accessibility to products subject to IPRs on the other.
According to proponents of the public policy perspective of IPRs, the
pre-TRIPS protection of international IPRs balanced the interests of
consumers and producers of IPRs. IPRs were, in the pre-TRIPS period,
understood as being intended to support public uses for information that
scientists, teachers, students, business people, librarians, and others needed.
Private use was guaranteed to the extent that it fulfilled these public
purposes. TRIPS, by contrast, has created a catalogue of extensive
liabilities that compromise these public uses of IPRs. In fact, TRIPS seems
to be predicated on the notion that any uncompensated use of IPRs is
subject to sanctions. TRIPS has thus upset that balance by overprotecting
the rights of producers at the expense of the interests of consumers and,
indeed, even of other producers of IPRs by constricting an arena of social
and commercial space for uncompensated "fair uses.27
Proponents of TRIPS, as noted above, claim that developing countries
are stealing the IPRs of Western innovators, thereby compromising future
productivity. This, the argument goes, is critical because America's
economy presently stands on its competitive advantage in intellectual
property. However, there is clearly a countervailing view. This
countervailing view regards it as imperative to maintain a "balance" in a
country's popular, legal, and technical conceptions of intellectual property.
In the United States, this balance is founded in the Constitution's patent

solution in the near future can be foreseen .. ." FRIEDRICH A. VON
THE ERRORS OF SOCILIuSM 37 (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988).
217. See Stakes, supra note 188, at 270-71.
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and copyright clause.21 This clause implies a balancebetween intellectual
property and an intellectualcommons and, if the balance tilts too heavily
in one direction, the public loses its constitutionally protected right to a
vigorous public domain.219 Similarly, a variety of developing countries
adopted policies that excluded pharmaceutical and agricultural products
from IPR protection with a view towards maintaining their public health
and food needs through affordable medicines and food.22°
In the pre-TRIPS era, international protection of IPRs was embodied in
" ' There were two underlying principles
a number of international treaties.22
related to international IPR protection in the pre-TRIPS regime. First, IPR
protection was based on the principle of national treatment. Under this
principle, each country was bound to protect the IPRs of other countries in
a manner that was no worse than the manner in which it protected its own.
That is, every country was only obliged to protect the IPRs of other
countries as it protected its own. Second, under the principle of national
treatment each country retained its sovereignty in determining its own level
of IP protection, except in a few instances in which international treaties
included substantive protections.222
In essence, TRIPS is unprecedented. It is unprecedented because it is
the first treaty that provides a minimum international substantive regime of
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
219. See LAWRENCE LESSio, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). However,
courts in the United States have expanded the scope of American intellectual property rights in
ways that undermine that implicit constitutional balance. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 318 (1980), for example, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that non-naturally occurring
manufacture (or genetically created micro-organisms or life forms) qualify as patentable subject
matter. In State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit similarly extended the scope of patentable
subject matter by holding that "the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers,
calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render
it nonstatutory subject matter, unless.., its operation does not produce 'a useful, concrete and
tangible result."' Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappot, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). In
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 360 (1991), the U.S.
Supreme Court apparently opened the door to copyrighting compilations of information if there
is a,degree of creativity in the selection and compilation of the data.
220. See Vandana Shiva, Farmers' Rights and the Convention on Biological Diversity, in
BIODIPLOMACY: GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 107, 114-15 (Vincente
Sanchez & Calestous Juma eds., 1994).
221. See generally,e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised on July 14, 1967 in Stockholm); Berne Convention for the
Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341 (as revised on July 24,
1971 in Paris).
222. See GATT, supra note 144, art. III, § 4.
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IPR protection. Unlike any other WTO agreement, TRIPS also departs
from the norm of regulatory diversity. Hence, GATT,for example, provides
general principles such as most-favored-nation status (MFN) and national
treatment for determining whether countries are proceeding with trade
liberalization.123 Each member country then can choose how best to meet
the goals of liberalization. However, TRIPS is the first example of an
international trade treaty that aims at deep integration, as it is not premised
on achieving trade goals through regulatory diversity.
The departure of the TRIPS agreement from the principle of national
treatment, as well as from regulatory diversity, has had both procedural and
substantive consequences for IPR protection. Procedurally, TRIPS
sidestepped the role of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) as the international institution through which international
protection of IPRs was to be coordinated. The WIPO, the United States
argued, with the prodding of the IPC, had to be avoided as the institutional
home for international IPR enforcement. GATT, with the promise of the
WTO and an enhanced dispute resolution machinery, was the forum with
more promise of international IPR enforcement.
It is important to mention that the national treatment principle is indeed
preserved under the provisions of TRIPS in Article 3.224 Under Article 3,
the exceptions allowed under the pre-existing intellectual property
conventions of the WIPO are also allowed under TRIPS. 5 Where these
exceptions allow material reciprocity, a consequential exception to MFN
treatment is also permitted. 226 TRIPS also provides for certain other limited
exceptions to the MFN obligation. 7
Substantively, TRIPS came to embody the interests of the IPC-led
Western coalition. A primary example of how TRIPS overprotects the
interests of Western countries, particularly those of the United States, is
that IPRs are defined as only those forms of knowledge that are capable of
industrial application. 22 This definition reflects the sector in which the
United States has the largest export sales. It excludes all sectors that
produce and innovate outside the industrial mode ofproduction. Profits and
223. See id art. I,§ I, art. III,§4.
224. TRIPS, supranote 5, art. 3.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. Article 27(1) of TRIPS provides that, "patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application."
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capital accumulation through industrialization are recognized as the only
ends to which IPRs can be put.22 9 In addition, IPR protection in TRIPS is
non-derogable, meaning that, unlike public international law treaties, such
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,23 countries
cannot make reservations to TRIPS without the consent of all signatory
state parties. 2331 It would be difficult to get such consent.
The sovereignty that countries had in the pre-TRIPS era to determine
how far to extend IPR protection was lost. For example, in the pre-TRIPS
era, a variety of developing countries had decided not to extend patent
protection to pharmaceuticals. The reason was to ensure the availability of
medicines to their citizens at affordable prices. In other words, some
countries had chosen not to extend monopoly protection to certain
products in the public interest.
The post-TRIPS international environment narrowed the sovereignty of
countries bound by TRIPS to determine appropriate levels of IPR
protection. Unlike GATT, for example, TRIPS does not embody the
principle of special and differential treatment. Under this principle,
developing countries were entitled to preferential trading relationships. For
example, while developed countries trade on the basis of the norm of
reciprocity or unconditional MFN status, developing countries do not enjoy
the same level of obligations as industrialized nations. Hence, a developing
country in trading with a developed country does not have to extend the
trading privileges it extends to that developed country to all members of
GATT.
The developed country, by contrast, is obliged to extend all the
privileges it extends to its trading partners to all members of GATT. This
in essence gave developing countries a chance to participate in international
trade with countries with much higher levels of economic achievement. In
addition, the developing countries also received trading privileges such as
preferential access for their imports in the markets of developed countries.
However, as noted above, such preferential access for developing country
imports in the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences
was conditioned on developing countries signing on to TRIPS.232 In
addition, other cross-conditionalities or cross-retaliatory measures require

229.
230.
U.N.T.S.
231.
232.

Shiva, supra note 220, at 110, 115-16.
See generally International Covenant Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
171.
Id. art. 72.
See supra text accompanying note 201.

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 323 2001-2002

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14

developing countries to protect the IPRs of the United States without the
risk of suffering retaliatory sanctions under section 301 of the Omnibus
Trade Act of 1988.233
So what is left of the public policy-oriented conception of IPRs in
TRIPS? There is a prospect that the multiple extra-TRIPs voluntary
arrangements entered into between developing countries and
pharmaceutical companies to provide pharmaceuticals on concessional
terms evidence a recognition by pharmaceutical corporations of the large
public policy concerns underlying international IPR protection.
Various provisions of TRIPS embody a sense of balancing the
protection of IPRs on the one hand, and the underlying public policy
objectives that the protection of IPRs requires on the other. More
importantly, the inclusion of policy objectives and the various exceptions
to IPR protection reflect the flexibility with which the commodity
conception of private property rights embedded in TRIPS ought to be
construed and applied.
Article 7 provides that the protection and enforcement of IPRs should
contribute both to the promotion of technological innovation, which is
much to the advantage of developed countries, and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology to developing countries.2 34 This sense of
balance is also provided in Article 7 which states that IPR protection is not
an end in itself.2 35 This article contextualizes IPR protection first to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge, and
second, to the promotion of social and economic welfare and to the
balancing of rights and obligations.236

Article 8 recognizes the rights of members to adopt measures for public
health and other public interest reasons and to prevent the abuse of IPRs,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement.237 Article 8, section 2 further provides that
"[a]ppropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the

233. See supra text accompanying notes 199-204.
234. See TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 7.
235. See id.

236. This Article should be read in conjunction with the preamble, which reproduces the
basic Uruguay Round negotiating objectives established in the TRIPS area by the 1986 Punta del
Este Declaration and the 1988-89 Mid-Term Review. See id., preamble.
237. Id. art. 8.
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provisions of [TRIPS], may be needed to prevent abuse of intellectual
property rights by right holders or resort to practices which unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer oftechnology."238
The WTO recently endorsed this view ofbalancing between the interests
of producers and consumers of IPRs in its background paper to the African
Trade Ministers conference in Libreville late last year. 239 Hence, I claim that
the exclusivity of patent protection, especially in the pharmaceutical
industry, ought to be seen in the context of balancing the interests of the
industry in recovering its investments on the one hand, and the interests of
consumers, and especially low-end consumers suffering from life
threatening illnesses on the other.
Indeed, if TRIPS is read as an inflexible regime of exclusive IPR
protection, that would legitimize a market failure in the provision of drugs,
particularly for low-end consumers suffering from life threatening diseases
such as AIDS. That is to say, TRIPS exacerbates the lack of access to and
the lack of affordability of AIDS drugs, especially for low-end consumers,
in light of the already prevailing anti-competitive international
pharmaceutical industry.
In addition, there are a variety of other provisions in TRIPS that
contemplate a balancing of the interests of producers and users of IPRs.
Whereas these provisions are hedged with limitations requiring consistency
with protection of IPRs, they nevertheless give governments some
discretion in realizing certain public policy objectives. Article 6, for
example, makes provisions for the principle of international exhaustion,
which allows parallel imports. 24 0 Article 30 permits members to provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent in instances
relating to experimental uses and noncommercial uses.24 However, such an
exception would be subject to the proviso that it must "not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and [must] not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interestsof thirdparties.", 2 Article 27, section
3(b) allows for the non-patentability of substances existing in nature and,

238.
239.
(Oct. 23,
240.
241.
242.

Id. art. 8, § 2.
Libreville 2000- Meeting of African Trade Ministers, WTO Doc. No. M/LIB/SYN 15
2000), available at http:/ www.itd.org/libreville/libreback_e.htm.
TRIPS, supranote 5, art. 6.
Id. art. 30.
Id. (emphasis added).
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to an arguable extent, of animals and plants.243 Article 13 arguably allows
for an exception to copyright protection under the fair use or private use
exception.2 " Article 31 allows compulsory licensing, although it is qualified
by at least eight preconditions.245 Article 28 provides for parallel imports.246
The coercive bargaining framework within which TRIPS was accepted
has been acknowledged as a primary reason for reading flexibility into it.
There was overwhelming pressure to have TRIPS embody the commodity
conception of IPR protection. One outcome of the dominance of Western
countries, and the United States in particular, in promoting a vision of IPR
protection heavily biased towards developed countries was that the
underlying public policy issues were significantly understated. That explains
why the foregoing provisions of TRIPS are hedged with requirements for
consistency with what is really the commodity version of IPRs. 24v
In addition, little attention was paid to the costs of developing countries
benefitting from this new legal framework (TRIPS) without the fiscal and
institutional wherewithal to realize its benefits. In essence, TRIPS was
designed to benefit the interests of industries in developed countries, which
have the resources and experience to take advantage of this new agreement.
In addition to private businesses in developing countries standing to lose
from TRIPS, the governments of developing countries may fare no better
as they continue to suffer high compliance costs in implementing required
policy changes.248 It is now clear, in retrospect, that TRIPS was negotiated

243. Id. art. 27, § 3(b).
244. Id. art. 13. However, see Okediji, Toward an InternationalFair Use Doctrine, supra
note 188, at 78-79.
245. TRIPS, supranote 5, art. 31. These conditions include: (1) that authorization of the use
without the consent of the patent owner must be considered on its individual merits; (2) that
efforts to obtain a voluntary license on reasonable terms and conditions must first be made (except
for government use, which only requires notification); (3) that the scope and duration of the use
must be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized; (4) that the use must be nonexclusive;
(5) that the use must be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
member authorizing the use; (6) that the authorization of use can be terminated if and when the
circumstances which led it to cease to exist are unlikely to recur; (7) that the patent owner must
be paid adequate remuneration, taking into account the economic value of the authorization and
the decisions relating to authorization; and (8) that remuneration must be subject to judicial
review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority within that member. Id.
246. Id. art. 28.
247. CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE
THIRD WORLD 69-80 (1990).
248. Under Article 67 of TRIPS, developed countries committed themselves to providing

technical and financial support to developing and least developed countries, with a view towards
assisting them in implementing TRIPS. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 67.
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under circumstances that understated the significance of public policy and
the development implications of IPRs. The Uruguay Round was too
focused on trade in and of itself, as if removing border restrictions on trade
was necessary for developing countries to solve their development
problems. As J. Michael Finger noted, the WTO is still moving in this same
direction; only this time its clarion cry seems to be that of shaping all
domestic regulatory and legal systems from the institutional infrastructure
of the economy to the export interests of the developed world.249 There are
at least five reasons for cautious optimism for a public policy-oriented
perspective having a place on the table alongside the perspective of those
who support exclusivity of patent protection.
First, like South Africa, Thailand has also benefited from such an
understanding by the United States with regard to its compulsory licensing
laws. Writing to Thailand, the USTR's office noted:
We encourage Thai officials to explore all options for extending
access to effective treatments, including ongoing direct dialogue with
pharmaceutical manufacturers. But the final choice is one for
Thailand to make. If the Thai government determines that issuing a
compulsory license is required to address its health care crisis, the
United States will raise no objection, provided the compulsory
license is, issued in a manner fully consistent with the WTO
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
250
(TRIPS).
This retreat by the United States is instructive to the extent that it
provides a role for public policy with regard to AIDS as it relates to patents.
Although unsurprisingly encumbered with a proviso that Thailand must
engage in compulsory licensing consistent with TRIPS, it represents a
departure from a prior policy that seemed impervious to policy claims in the
context of the AIDS epidemic.
249. J. Michael Finger, The Uruguay Round North South Bargain: Will the WTO Ever Get
Over It?, delivered at the Conference on the Political Economy of International Trade Law in
Honor of Professor Robert E. Hudec, (Sept. 15-16, 2000). Chakravarthi Raghavan, The World
Trade Organizationand Its Dispute Settlement System: Tilting the Balance Against the South
(Trade and Development Series No. 9, 2000), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/
tilting.htm, similarly argues that the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism is a complex and
expensive proposition for developing countries.
250. Letter from Joseph S. Papovich to Mr. Paisan Tan-Ud (Jan. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/ustrlettejan27.html.
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In addition, the use of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193021 by the
United States in the Thailand AntiAids Drug case, which was subsequently
invalidated by a GATT panel, provides a hopeful precedent.252 In that case,
a Thai patent law allowing for compulsory licensing of patents that had not
been used in the country was at issue. 5 3 Pfizer had only recently succeeded
in pushing the TRIPS agreement through and registering its patents on
Tetracine and AntiAids in Thailand. Thailand informed Pfizer that, because
it had not established local processing of these drugs, it would invoke
compulsory licensing with a view towards addressing a rapidly growing rate
of HIV infection.25 4 To safeguard its interests in Thailand, Pfizer filed a
complaint with the United States International Trade Commission under
section 337 of the TariffAct of 193 0 requesting preliminary and permanent
relief for the importation of drugs manufactured in Thailand in
contravention of Pfizer's patents.255 Section 337 proceedings were at the
time extremely attractive to U.S. companies and burdensome to foreign
companies because they had relaxed standards of evidence (including
hearsay) and relatively short periods of discovery and trial (limited to
seventy days), compared to a proceeding in a federal district court. 6
In 1989, a GATT panel ruled that Section 337 violated the national
treatment provisions of Article III, Section 4 of GATT. 2 7 The panel noted
that imported goods were treated less favorably than domestic goods under
Section 337, and the GATT council adopted the decision. 58 Subsequently,
the United States amended Section 337 to allow counterclaims in

251. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (1930) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2001)) (allowing for seizure and destruction of patent-infringing
goods).
252. Id. For a description of the facts and points of law at issue, see also RALPH H. FOLSOM
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 798-823 (1995). Note that the United States
moved to comply with the Panel's findings in Section 337 when it incorporated the Uruguay
Round commitments into its domestic legislation. See Press Release, U.S. Trade Policy Review
Body of the WTO, Review of United States TPRB'S Evaluation (Nov. 12, 1996), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tpre/tp49_e.htm.
253. See Papovich, supra note 250.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See William A. Zeitler, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 239 (1992) (reviewing
DONALD KNOX DUVALL, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION ACTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

UNDER SECTION 337 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 (1990)).

257. Section 337, supranote 156,
258. Id.

6.3.
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proceedings initiated under its authority." 9 While this may have been a
limited victory since there are several other arenas where the battle over
pharmaceuticals was playing out, it illustrates that there are spaces within
the present structure of GATT/WTO law for accommodating actions such
as compulsory licensing.
The second reason for hope involves the recent South African
controversy, which also relates to compulsory licensing. South Africa
passed legislation titled the "South African Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997," which is similar to
Thailand's law allowing compulsory licensing." Soon thereafter, the USTR
put South Africa on the watch-list under super 301 of the Trade Act, which
authorizes the USTR to commence investigations with a view towards
establishing violations ofU.S. IPRs, which would in turn form the basis for
retaliatory action.2"'
After intense public protest in South Africa, around the world, and in the
United States, then-Vice President Al Gore formed a commission, which he
jointly chaired with President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. On September
17, 1999, as noted above, South Africa and the United States reached an
understanding that accommodated South Africa's concerns relating to the
AIDS crisis as well as the United States's concerns regarding patent
protection.62 The USTR thus withdrew South Africa from the watch list.
The success of public pressure on a senior administration official
demonstrates room for administrative interventions, which may create
room, albeit in minimal ways, for advancing a public policy oriented view
of IPRs. Subsequently, the big pharmaceutical companies withdrew a suit
against the South African government for passing legislation that is in part
inconsistent with the government's commitments under TRIPS.
The third reason for hope is an executive order signed by President
Clinton in 2000 ordering the USTR not to impose trade sanctions against
a sub-Saharan African country pursuing a policy or law aimed at addressing

259. Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4814 (as

incorporated into U.S. law by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994).
260. See Zachie Achmat, We Can Use Compulsory Licensingand ParallelImports: A South

African Case Study, Aids Law Project, (Nov. - Dec. 1999), available at http://www.hri.ca/
partners/alp/tac/iicense.shtml.
261. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, § 1302, 102
Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (2001)).
262. See supranotes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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the AIDS epidemic.263 As noted above, this executive order also seeks to
give such countries an incentive to comply with TRIPS. Some
administration officials, such as Secretary of State Madeline Albright, took
the view that the AIDS crisis constituted a situation that involved the
national security interests of the United States. That view was explored in
January 2000, when Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the U.N., addressed a forum convened as part of the U.N.'s focus on
Africa that month.2"
Fourth, Bristol Myers-Squib, which together with Yale University owns
patent rights for the AIDS drug Zerit, announced in March 2000 that it will
waive those patent rights in South Africa. In effect, Bristol-Myers Squib
and Yale University have opened the door for a drug still enjoying a patent
monopoly in countries other than South Africa for marketing as a generic.265
Bristol Myers-Squib also announced that it would sell its AIDS drugs,
Videx and Zerit, to any African country for the cost of one dollar per day
per dosage, eighty five cents for Videx and fifteen cents for Zerit.266 The
announcement by Bristol Myers-Squib came very shortly after Merck
announced that it would sell two of its AIDS drugs, Crixivan and Stocrin,
to poor countries at about one-tenth the United States price.
However, in March 2000, both Bristol Myers-Squib and Merck were
part of a five company initiative - together with Boehringer Ingelheim,
Glaxo Welcome (now GlaxoSmithKline), and F. Hoffinan La Roche--with
UNAIDS that unsuccessfully sought to reduce prices of anti-retrovirals by
eighty-five percent. Critics of this initiative have called it a public relations
gimmick, and one hopes that these new arrangements do not fail to come
through as well.267 In addition, Bristol Myers-Squib, in late 2000, pulled out
and eventually scaled back its own commitment ofa $100 million charitable
initiative it dubbed "Secure The Future" to fight AIDS in Africa. In

263. See supranote 183 and accompanying text.
264. Gore VowsAIDSHelpforAfrica: SecurityCouncilAddresses Crisis,MONITOR CHRON.,
Jan. 11, 2000, at AI2.
265. According to John L. McGoldrick, Bristol Myers' Executive Vice President, "This is not
about patents; it's about poverty and a devastating disease.. . . We seek no profits on AIDS drugs
in Africa and we will not let our patents be an obstacle." Karen DeYoung & Bill Brubaker,
Another Firm Cuts HIV DrugPrices,WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at Al.

266. Id.
267. Dagi Kimani, Why Not Take Up Offer of CheaperAIDS Drugs?, DAILY NATION, Feb.
24, 2001; see also Barton Gellman, A Turning Pointthat Left Millions Behind: Drug Discounts
Benefit Few While ProtectingPharmaceuticalCompanies' Profits, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2000,
at AO1.
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withdrawing the commitment, Bristol-Myers was acknowledging an internal
debate on what moral obligations the company had towards sick people
who could not afford medicines and how such obligations would be
reconciled with the company's commercial objectives.268
Another hopeful effort on the horizon is an offer by Cipla, an Indian
company that manufactures generics, to supply AIDS drugs to developing
countries at extremely low prices. It has announced its willingness to sell
generic versions of eight of the fifteen anti-HIV drugs, which, in varying
combinations, are used in the cocktails, at a nominal fee of $600 per year
per patient - a small fraction of the $10,000 to $15,000 that high-income
consumers pay.269 Cipla has also made an offer to supply these drugs at
$350 per year per patient to Doctors Without Borders. Cipla hopes that its
initiative will bring down the price of AIDS drugs by breaking their
monopoly pricing.27 °
Fifth, and significantly, is the discretion that developing countries have
in complying with the TRIPS agreement. At the outset, clearly Article 7 of
TRIPS provides for safeguard provisions, and Article 8 provides for public
interest exceptions.27 ' Under these provisions, as well as underprovisions
allowing compulsory and parallel licensing, developing countries can legally
depart from TRIPS in order to address public health emergencies such as.
the AIDS epidemic.272 Some scholars have suggested that these countries
should adopt high standards of patentability so that only revolutionary, as
opposed to merely improving, inventions are granted patents.273 Another
method might be to allow prior art form to defeat novelty. This might be
very useful in cases in which developing countries contend that a patent
claim is based on pre-existing indigenous knowledge. All of these instances
would be justifiable, as there is no consensus on an international standard
of absolute novelty.274

268. Bill Brubaker, The Limits of $100 Million: Epidemic's Complexities Curb Impact of
Bristol-Myers's Initiative, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2000, at Al.
269. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Africa's AIDS War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al.
270. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Indian Company Offers to Supply AIDS Drugs at Low Cost in
Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at Al.
271. TRIPS, supra note 5, arts. 7-8.
272. See James Love, Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord:
Models For State Practice in Developing Countries (paper for United Nations Department
Programme, 200 1), availableat http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/recommededstate practive.html.
273. See Oddi, supra note 3, at 464-65.
274. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 30.
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Ultimately, it seems very plausible that one of the ways in which
compliance with TRIPS would best be achieved is by ensuring an
international consensus on the core values underlying it. 5 This would imply
balancing public and private uses ofIPRs as well as balancing the needs and
imperatives of capital with basic needs such as affordable and accessible
foods and medicines for the world's low-end consumers. A threat-based
TRIPS agreement cannot balance these interests in a way that guarantees
its legitimacy.

C. The Dialecticsof Competing Conceptions of Propertyin TRIPS
The public policy perspective of IPRs both affirms and contradicts the
private property logic as well as the free trade goals of the WTO. It affirms
the free trade goals of the WTO because the forms of flexibility under

Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement are required to be consistent with
protection of IPRs. Hence, although there are limits to IPR protection,
these limits are carefully circumscribed. The commodity conception ofIPRs
leaves limited room for the underlying public policy goals embedded in
TRIPS.276

Yet, in another respect, the commodity conception of IPRs in TRIPS
contradicts the public policy goals underlying TRIPS by circumscribing
public policy goals to the narrow confines of consistency with IPR
protection. In the same respect, to the extent that the public policy
limitations of IPR protection are a part of TRIPS, they are inconsistent with
IPR protection.
In short, it is not entirely implausible to observe that recognizing the
commodity conception of IPRs, as well as the social and political character
of IPRs, would be laden with contradictions, but also have room for
complementarity. The public policy oriented vision of IPRs contradicts the
275. Michael W. Smith, BringingDevelopingCountries'IntellectualProperty
Laws to TRIPs
Standards: Hurdlesand Pifalls Facing Vietnam's Efforts to Normalize an Intellectual Property
Regime, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 211, 235 (1999).
276. There is some case law in the United States suggesting that courts will not protect
holders of patents against infringement when a patent has been misused. This is an exercise of
equitable discretion, and as such, "courts... may appropriately withhold their aid where the
plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest." Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 402, 492 (1942). A leading U.S. antitrust authority, the late Phillip
Areeda, opined that, although what is contrary to the public interest is open-ended, "[it does seem
clear.., that conduct offensive to the antitrust laws is a misuse." PHILLip AREEDA & LouIs
KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 183 (4th ed. 1988).
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market-oriented property vision of IPRs because it acknowledges that
limitations on the commodity-oriented conception are necessary and
reasonable.

V. FDA CARTELIZATION OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR Low-END CONSUMERS
My thesis in this part of the Article is that the FDA's high standards of
drug safety and effectiveness, which are embodied in pre-marketing testing
and approval requirements, result in the cartelization of the pharmaceutical
industry. The FDA's cartel effect is the indirect and unintended result of a
regulatory regime for drug approval that is heavily driven by perverse
notions of risk. In addition, this regulatory regime acts as an insurance
mechanism for the pharmaceutical industry to avoid the high costs
associated with product liability for unsafe and ineffective drugs. In short,
these high standards of drug approval have the result of cartelizing the
pharmaceutical industry.
This regulatory environment exacerbates an already restrictive
international IPR protection regime, which leaves little flexibility for public
policy demands. Two examples will suffice to illustrate how TRIPS
exacerbates the restrictiveness of FDA regulation. First, TRIPS does not
allow departures or reservations from IPR protection except with the
consent of all countries that have signed onto it.2" Second, notwithstanding
the potential in TRIPS for balancing the interests of producers and
consumers of IPRs as discussed in Part III above, trade agreements have
been construed so narrowly as to rule out those public policy concerns.278
The FDA's high standards of drug approval, exacerbated by TRIPS, act
as a barrier for entry of new competitors into the pharmaceutical industry,
leading to the cartelization of the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, according
to the U.N. Development Program, 35% of the $297 billion industry in
1998 was controlled by the top ten pharmaceutical companies."79 In 1999,
the median return on equity for the twelve pharmaceuticals members of the
Fortune 500 was 35.8%, which was more than double the median return of

277. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 72.
278. See supra notes 145-71 and accompanying text.
279. UNiTED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 67
(1999).
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15.2% for the Fortune 500 as a whole.2"' These returns were net, taking
" ' The pharmaceutical
into account the sector's large research expenses.28
industry also ranked first in return on assets as well as return on revenues.282
Cartelization in the pharmaceutical industry has at least three
consequences, all of which are detrimental to the access and affordability of
AIDS drugs. First, it impedes competition in the international
pharmaceutical industry by deterring new entrants into the industry. Second,
it is directly related to the high cost of AIDS drugs, which have become
unaffordable for terminally ill, low-end consumers. Third, it limits
expeditious access to AIDS drugs.
The United States Government's anti-competitive action, to wit its
participation in the cartelization of the pharmaceutical industry through its
statutory regime of drug approval, is arguably contrary to a general
principle of international law that favors free competition. While the
imprimatur of a government shields it from antitrust liability, particularly in
the intellectual property realm, the anti-competitive effect of governmental
action in cartelizing the pharmaceutical industry violates antitrust law.

A- FDA Regulation: Pre-MarketingTesting and Approval
The FDA's regulatory framework is the cumulative result of legislative
responses to drug-related tragedies such as the thalidomide scare of the
1950S. 283 The stricter regulation of drug approval that has come about as a
result of drug scares in part reflects how perverse notions of risk inform
policy. While tightening drug approval is critical for public confidence in
available drugs on the market, 2" no regulatory regime could entirely
eliminate all risks given the uncertainties of scientific evidence. This being
the case, any regulatory regime will involve a choice as to the level of risk
that can be adopted. However, in view of the FDA's responsiveness to, at
times irrational public perceptions of risk, its regulatory environment is
tilted towards eliminating risk at the expense of other legitimate public
policy goals. Such goals include expeditious access to affordable drugs for
280. How the Industries Stack Up, FORTUNE, Apr. 2000, at F27.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
284. There is also the possibility that product liability law acts as a background against which
the FDA's regulatory environment has grown. In other words, a tough regulatory environment
serves as a form of insurance against product liability for the pharmaceutical industry.
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terminally ill patients. In addition, given that there is bound to be imperfect
competition in any industry, including the pharmaceutical industry, the
choice of a regulatory framework is one between imperfect regulation
(insofar as it is impossible to eliminate all risk) and imperfect competition.
The FDA's authority to approve drugs for safety and effectiveness falls
into four stages: Pre-clinical Testing; Investigational New Drug (IND)
Testing; New Drug Application (NDA) Testing; and Post-Market
Surveillance. The following is a brief discussion of each.

1. Pre-Clinical Testing
The purpose of this stage is to determine whether a drug is sufficiently
safe and promising to justify human clinical testing. To make this
determination, the drug sponsor must engage in pre-clinical testing. The
drug sponsor must then file an Investigational New Drug Application (IND)
with the FDA. 8 5 The IND application must contain all of the active
ingredients of the drug to be tested, a summary of any previous human
experience with the drug, a description of the overall investigation plan,
identification of phases of clinical investigation, a list of possible risks and
side effects, a protocol for each study to be conducted, and a summary of
pharmacological and toxicological effects of the drug on animals. 216 It is
estimated that pre-clinical testing takes about thirty months.

2. Investigational New Drug (IND) Testing
If the FDA does not object to IND testing, the applicant then proceeds
to clinical testing on human subjects. This stage comes in three phases.
Although these phases are not required under the law, the FDA recognizes
them as part of the process for establishing the safety and effectiveness of
drugs.28 7 Phase I, which lasts approximately six months, involves testing the
drug's safety on about twenty to eighty volunteers. The subjects are tested
for the safe dosage level of the drug, tolerance to the drug, how the drug
is administered, and how the drug is eliminated from the body. Phase II,
285. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a) (2001).
286. Id. § 312.23.
287. See Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Injuries, 53
Fed. Reg. 41,518 (Oct. 21, 1988).
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which involves several hundred subjects, tests the drug's safety and
effectiveness and could last up to eighteen months. Phase III takes place
only in cases where there is reasonable evidence about the drug's safety and
effectiveness. In this phase, the drug applicant has to administer the drug
under circumstances in which a physician would prescribe the drug. The aim
is to further the assessment ofthe safety and effectiveness of the dosage and
its effectiveness in treatment. A drug under consideration takes three years
to pass Phase III. The FDA has authority to terminate clinical testing at any
phase if it believes that the drug is unsafe and ineffective. 8 '

3. NDA Testing and Post-Market Surveillance
Where an applicant can show the FDA promising results through Phase
III, it may submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for approval
to market the drug. This stage, which involves hundreds to several thousand
patients, takes an average of five years. The FDA may also condition its
NDA approval upon the submission of post-marketing approval studies.289
The post-marketing approval study stage is also known as Phase IV. Only
manufacturers, rather than physicians, are required to report suspected
adverse drug reactions. While post-marketing surveillance is not a statutory
requirement, it is now customary for the FDA to require it with a view
towards monitoring a drug's ongoing safety and efficacy. FDA approval
requires "substantial evidence" of a drug's safety and effectiveness, as
established through adequate and well-controlled investigations." 9

4. Terminally-Ill and AIDS Related Exceptions to FDA Regulation
There are several ways in which terminally-ill AIDS patients benefit from
shortened processes of FDA pre-market testing. In 1987, for example, the
FDA began the Treatment Investigational New Drug program (Treatment
IND), which allows physicians to prescribe unapproved experimental drugs
to terminally ill patients. The FDA stipulates that physicians may prescribe
unapproved, experimental drugs only when no comparable or satisfactory

288. 21 C.F.R. § 312.44 (2001).
289. Marion J. Finkel, Phase IV Testing: FDA Viewpoint andExpectations, 33 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 181, 183-84 (1978).
290. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2001).
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" ' The Treatment IND program is
alternative drug or therapy is available.29
an example of the FDA's acknowledgment of the need for speedy
development of safe and effective drugs for terminally-ill patients. However,
the requirement that an illness be "immediately life threatening" restricts the
program's utility to individuals suffering from HIV-related opportunistic
diseases.292
The Treatment IND program was expanded in the early 1990s to
improve expedited approval of AIDS -drugs through a "parallel track"
mechanism.293 This mechanism allows drug sponsors to conduct parallel
studies without the use of experimental controls, which ensures quality
control. Expedited approval is facilitated through the provision of
experimental drugs to those enrolled in the parallel studies. Such terminallyill patients would not have had access to these drugs under standard FDA
pre-marketing approval trials, as only those enrolled in FDA clinical trials
have access to experimental drugs. In short, the "parallel track" mechanism
allows expanded availability ofexperimental drugs through parallel studies
conducted by the sponsor. However, only patients for whom there is no
alternative treatment available and who are ineligible to participate in FDA
trials can participate in expedited access to experimental drugs under the
"parallel track" mechanism.294
Another mechanism providing for an accelerated process of drug
approval is the "fast track" process. Since 1988, the FDA has reserved the
power to eliminate Phase II testing to facilitate a faster process of
establishing the safety and efficacy of a drug. Under this process, the FDA
evaluates requests for expedited approval after Phase II testing by
examining the risks and benefits of the drug, the severity of the disease, and
the availability of alternative remedies.29 5 Under the fast track process,
drugs that meet the FDA's safety and effectiveness criteria can be approved
without Phase III testing.2" The fast track process is an incentive for
terminally-ill patients not to participate in risky, underground, unapproved,

291. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(iii) (2001).
292. See Lisa Terrizzi, The Needfor ImprovedAccess to ExperimentalDrug Therapy:AIDS
Activists and Their Callfor a Parallel Track Policy, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 589, 609-10 (1991).

293. Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track
Mechanism for People with AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250, 13,258
(Apr. 15, 1992).
294. Stuart L. Nightingale et al., Access to InvestigationalDrugsforTreatment Purposes,

50 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 845, 845 (1994).
295. 21 C.F.R. § 312.84 (2001).
296. Id. § 312.80.
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and uncontrolled studies. Under this process, an applicant can apply for
FDA approval to conduct clinical trials without the use of placebo control
groups if7alternative effective therapies can be used for comparison and
control.

29

Another exception, which has been in force since 1989, for the use of
drugs that have not received FDA approval is the Personal Use Exception
Program. Under this program, unapproved drugs that are for the treatment
of threatening or serious conditions and that do not pose a significant health
risk may be brought into the United States by an individual or through the
mail. Although the Personal Use Exception Program was initially intended
for AIDS and cancer patients, it now covers a variety of drugs. 29" This
program, which is the result of AIDS activism, has been criticized as being
only available to patients who can afford to import unapproved drugs. In
addition, the availability of this option has been cited as a disincentive for
terminally-ill patients to participate in FDA-approved clinical trials, which
could affect the accuracy of FDA drug safety and effectiveness
information.29
Another controversial avenue through which the FDA allows early
approval of new drugs for the treatment of serious or life-threatening
diseases, such as AIDS and Alzheimer's disease, is the application of
surrogate markers. A surrogate marker is defined by the FDA as a
"laboratory measurement or physical sign that is used in therapeutic trials
as a substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint that is a direct measure
of how a patient feels, functions, or survives and that is expected to predict
the effect of therapy."' "° Surrogate markers therefore measure a drug's
safety and effectiveness indirectly, unlike standard FDA procedures.
However, the FDA's approval in such instances is conditional. First, the
FDA requires post-marketing clinical studies of approved drugs based on
surrogate markers."' Second, a failure to conduct such studies with due
diligence or a failure to verify clinical benefit will result in the FDA's

297. Id. § 312.83.
298. Audrey A. Hale, Note, The FDA 's Mail Import Policy: A QuestionableResponse to the
.AIDS Epidemic, 16 RuTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 169, 169-70, 180 (1990).
299. See, e.g., Beth E. Myers, The Food and Drug Administration'sExperimental Drug
Approval System: Is It GoodFor Your Health?, 28 Hous. L. REV. 309, 309-10 (1991).
300. New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations, Accelerated Approval,
57 Fed. Reg. 13,234, 13,235 (Apr. 15, 1992).
301. Id.at 13,235.
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withdrawal of approval.3 2 The controversy surrounding surrogate markers
reflects a primary theme of this Article: while surrogate markers are
intended to expedite drug approval by short-circuiting costly and timeconsuming clinical trials, it is arguable that they could result in
compromising a drug's safety and efficacy.3 °3 Ultimately, the question is not
whether all risk can be eliminated,3 4 but what types of risks terminally-ill
patients are willing to accept in return for access to affordable drugs. This
also raises the question ofpaternalism.30 5 Does the government's regulatory
framework for drug approval compromise the rights of terminally-ill
patients to decide what products to use and therefore what risks to assume?
One of the most significant initiatives enacted by the FDA in response
to critics, who stated that pre-market testing procedures resulted in lengthy
approval times, is charging pharmaceutical companies a user fee when it
reviews their NDAs. 3 6 With this money, the FDA was able to hire more
drug reviewers and to shore up its resources with a view towards expediting
the drug approval process. The alliance of pharmaceutical companies and
AIDS activists hoped that user fees would substantially reduce the time
within which drugs were approved.30 7

B. The FDA's Regulatory Frameworkas a Barrierto
Entry, Access, andAffordability
Although the FDA's regulatory framework provides for a number of
exceptions, which provide for expeditious approval of AIDS drugs, the
rigorous requirements described above nevertheless act as barriers for new
entrants into the pharmaceutical industry. The following are some of the

302. Accelerated Approval of New Drugs for Serious and Life-Threatening Illnesses, 21
C.F.R. § 314.530 (2001).
303. Marsha F. Goldsmith, HIVIAIDS Early Treatment Controversy Cues New Advice But
QuestionsRemain, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 295, 296 (1993); Step By Step, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26,
1994, at 93.
304. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failureand Regulatory Failureas Catalystsfor
Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 23 (1989).
305. Marion Smiley, Legalizing Laetrile, in ETHics AND POLITICS CASES AND COMMENTS
310, 313 (Amy Gutman & Dennis Thompson eds., 1997).
306. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, § 101, 106 Stat.
4491, 4491 (1992).
307. Jon Hamilton, Uncloggingthe DrugPipeline: What the New FDA PolicyMeans to You,
8 AM. HEALTH: FITNESS OF BODY & MiND 78, 78 (1993).

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 339 2001-2002

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14

most important issues in terms of ease of entry into the pharmaceutical
industry.

1. Lengthy Approval Times
The foregoing process of drug approval takes at least seven years. In
particular, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 196238 imposed a variety
of clinical tests to establish drug safety and effectiveness. These
amendments came immediately after the Thalidomide scare, when the FDA
repeatedly declined to approve a sedative given to pregnant women because
of a lack of sufficient evidence of its safety and effectiveness. 3" In Europe
at the same time, Thalidomide was blamed for the incidence ofphocomelia,
a condition causing babies to be born with deformities and missing limbs.3" °
Although the drug did not receive FDA approval, its American sponsor had
distributed it to over 1,200 doctors for experimental testing.3 ' A small
outbreak of phocomelia occurred, leading to the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments, which tightened and thereby lengthened the FDA's drug
approval process.312 The various initiatives, such as the Treatment IND
program, that allow accelerated approval of drugs for patients suffering
from life-threatening diseases, validate the idea that lengthy approval times
are a problem.

2. Elimination of Risks in a Risk Adverse Society as a
Driving Force of FDA Regulation
The legislative response to the thalidomide scare illustrates how the
public perception of risk can shape FDA policy. Besides the thalidomide
scare, other public responses to drugs have shaped the FDA's authority.
Indeed, the Food and Drug Act of 1906 was in a large part a victory of the
progressive movement's concern about widespread food and drug

308. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No.87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301-81 (2001)).
309. PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 12324 (1980).
310. Id. at 123.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 124.
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impurities."3 ' The inadequacy of the 1906. law did not receive legislative
attention until 1937, when a drug-related tragedy propelled reform. In this
instance, it was Elixer Sulfanilamide, a drug approved for use in the United
States in pill form. In its liquid form, however, the solvent had not been
tested for toxicity, and it resulted in 107 deaths.314 This spurred the passage
of the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which required safety testing
and government approval of new drugs prior to commercial marketing.3"5
The next major legislative changes were in response to the thalidomide
6
scare.

31

It seems credible to argue that designing regulatory structures, such as
that of the FDA, with a view towards achieving a risk-free society would
adversely affect the allocation of resources for other purposes, such as
providing health care. Indeed, some studies illustrate a mismatch between
regulatory costs and risk reduction. a 7 Yet, the FDA's mandate for health
and safety regulation has arisen largely in response to public health scares.
The public hence reacts more emphatically and dramatically to risks related
to food supply and drugs than to incremental risks, such as those related to
coal. The thalidomide scare is a good example of such perverse responses
to risk. Cass Sunstein, therefore, argues that justifying government action
by collective action in instances involving the regulation of risk in food
supply, and also drugs, might yield outcomes such as regulatory regimes
that proceed from a sort of innate human inaccuracy of risk assessment.3 g
Similarly, Stephen Breyer notes that Congress has a penchant for trying to
solve social and economic problems by passing laws and regulations based
on moral conviction rather than economic analysis. 319 Hypothetically, one
can therefore argue that, even if the public were persuaded that free market
forces and product liability laws were sufficient to prevent the sale of unsafe

313. See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 384, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906)
(repealed 1938).
314. David F. Cavers, Food,Drugand CosmeticAct of 1938: Its Legislative History andIts
Substantive Provisions,6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939).
315. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301-95 (2001)).
316. See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., W. Kip ViscusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES

FOR RISK 5 (1992).
318. CASS SUNSTErN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 53 (1990).
319. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 3,8,378 (1982).
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food and drugs, the public would still probably insist on government
screening of new products before they were sold.

3. Stringent Requirements for Acceptance of Foreign Data
The FDA accepts foreign clinical data as evidence of safety and efficacy
of drugs where the clinical studies were "well designed, well conducted,
performed by qualified investigators, and conducted in accordance with
ethical principles acceptable to the world community. 32 ° There are two
categories under which foreign clinical data is accepted by the FDA: foreign
clinical studies that are not conducted under an IND, and approval based on
clinical data alone. Under the first category, data is accepted as primary
evidence of approval of a new drug provided that it meets the specification
" ' Under the second category, the data must be applicable to
noted above.32
the U.S.' population and current medical practice; it must be performed by
qualified clinical investigators; and the data can be considered valid without
the need for on-site inspection, or if the FDA considers such an inspection
necessary, it can validate the data through on-site inspection or other
appropriate means.322
While the conditions imposed on acceptance of foreign data in the
United States are primarily targeted at protecting the public from dangerous
and ineffective drugs, the European Union (EU) directives on the sale and
approval of medicinal products are aimed at protecting public health while
encouraging research and trade in the pharmaceutical industry.323 The
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) has the authority
within the EU to harmonize uniform and consistent data acceptance policies
between member states. The CPMP's guidelines have facilitated interagency collaboration within the EU, thereby shortening the process of drug
approval. The FDA's stringent requirements, by contrast, do not facilitate
the easy exchange of clinical data. FDA requirements therefore lead to
wasteful duplication of resources, as drugs approved abroad often have to
go through the U.S. regulatory process. This means that approval of drugs
320.
321.
322.
323.

21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a) (2001).
Id.
Id. § 314.106.
See Council Directive 65165, 1965 U.J.(B 22), reprinted in COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMuNITIEs, THE RULES GOVERNING MEDICINAL PRODUCTS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMuNITY 23 (1989); John J.Gorski, An FDA-EECPerspectiveon the InternationalAcceptance
ofForeign Clinical Data, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 329, 345-46 (1990-91).
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takes comparatively longer and the cost of drugs is comparatively higher in
the United States than in the European Union.324
In 1991, the U.S. President's Council on Competitiveness proposed
measures to enhance U.S. recognition of foreign drug approvals. For
example, countries that have reciprocity agreements with the United States
can have their data automatically accepted. The Council has also made
efforts towards developing common research and drug approval standards
between countries."' Other proposals call for allowing the use of animal
test data from Japan and the EEC in FDA review processes326 and joint
review of drugs by the FDA and foreign counterpart agencies in Japan,
Australia, and the EEC.327

4. High Costs Associated with the Lengthy Approval Process
The focus on protecting the public from risks related to unproven drugs
and the various departures from this regulatory regime, which increase the
time frame within which AIDS patients can get access to new drugs, are
costly to drug companies as well as to consumers. For example, Mark A.
Kassel has argued that the FDA's refusal to expeditiously approve effective
drugs that are available in other countries has resulted in mortality and
morbidity costs that were avoidable.32
Another cost passed on to the public, in addition to the FDA's goal of
maximum public safety, is product liability law.329 For example, the Third
Restatement on Torts permits courts and juries to second-guess FDA
determinations on effective drug design. Hence, under the Restatement, a

324. Although Congress has enacted legislation to encourage international cooperation in
addressing the AIDS crisis, the FDA's requirements for drug approval have remained intact. This
new law also aims at promoting international research, through institutions such as the WHO,
towards treatments and cures for AIDS. 22 U.S.C. § 6802 (2001).
325. Recommendations to Speed DrugApprovalsIssued, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Food
Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 44,603, 43,617 (1991).
326. Id. at 42,806.
327. Id. at 43,126.
328. Mark A. Kassel, Note, Getting There First with the Best: The Need to Shorten the
PrescriptionDrugApproval Process, 27 VAt. U. L. REV. 95, 99-102 (1992).
329. See Louis Lasagna, The ChillingEffect ofProductLiability on New DrugDevelopment,
in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 334, 336

(Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient
An Economic Rationalefor the FDA Regulatory ComplianceDefense,
PharmaceuticalLitigation:
24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1452-55 (1994).
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manufacturer could be held liable for prescription drugs and medical devices
whose risks outweighs their benefits, so that a health care provider knowing
these risks would not prescribe the product for any class of patient.330 A
1991 American Law Institute report also concluded that ever-increasing
safety controls do not always enhance social welfare, because the
incremental, typically diminishing, benefits of greater stringency may be
swamped by mounting costs including the loss of useful products.33 ' In
addition, because the FDA has sole authority over the labeling of
prescription drug products, pharmaceutical companies are exposed to
products liability suits in states in which the adequacy of a prescription drug
product's labeling is subject to jury resolution. The FDA justifies this
stringent control on the need to ensure that all labeling be supported by
reliable scientific evidence.332
The use of prescription drug use fees is also regarded as potentially
imposing financial impediments to research and development in general, as
well as, impeding market entry for new start-up biotechnology firms that do
not have the financial resources to meet this requirement. Such an outcome
is possible notwithstanding the fact that there are exceptions for small
business, as these exceptions limit, but do not eliminate, only one of three
kinds of fees payable to the FDA.333

5. Comparing the FDA to the British Experience
To appreciate the FDA's authority in its mandate of pre-market testing
of drugs for safety and effectiveness, it is important to briefly compare and
contrast this mandate with those at the equivalent British agencies. The
main difference between the British and the American process of drug
approval is that, while in the American system safety and effectiveness are

330.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 8 (tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
331. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY (1991).

332. For example, in Wooderson v. OrthoPharmaceuticalCorp., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984),
a manufacturer of oral contraceptives, based on some adverse reports, had asked the FDA to
permit a labeling change to warn consumers about a serious reaction that could cause kidney
failure. The FDA refused to permit the change. The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the FDA's
determination because the FDA's communication to the manufacturer could not determine that
consumers should not be warned that the drug could cause kidney failure. Id. at 1058.
333. See Danni Sabota, Biotech Firms Brace for New FDA User Fees, HOuS. Bus. J., Oct.
19, 1992, at 1.
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required through pre-marketing studies, under the British system they are
required through post-marketing surveillance. Pre-marketing testing in the
British system therefore takes a much shorter time.334
The agency for drug approval in Great Britain is the Medicines Division
of the Department of Health and Social Services. Drug approval is preconditioned on a showing of safety, quality, and efficacy both before and
after approval. The pre-approval process requires animal testing, a series of
safety studies, as well as a six month period of chronic toxicity study. 35 The
Medicines Division issues Clinical Trial Certificates, which authorize human
use of drugs. A Clinical Trial Certificate expires after two years unless it is
renewed. A Product License allows for the marketing of new drugs and is
issued for five years unless it is reviewed. The licenses impose a mandatory
reporting system, which requires physicians to report all adverse reactions
to drugs to the Committee on the Review of Medicine. This reporting
system in turn lays the foundation for the Committee on the Review of
Medicines' mandate to take action to prevent similar adverse reactions to
a drug.336 For example, the Committee on the Review of Medicines can
advise the Medicines Division to issue warnings to the public or to revoke
the drug's marketing license. 37
This is one of the main differences between British and U.S. drug
regulation, as the American system requires safety and effectiveness to be
shown prior to approval. This results in lengthy and costly pre-marketing
clinical trials. By contrast, in the British system, a drug's adverse effects,
safety information, as well as safety and efficacy, are demonstrated by postmarket surveillance.33
Critics argue that one of the downsides of the British system is that it
cannot reveal long-term adverse effects, which would require long-term,
FDA-type pre-market testing.339 Assuming that such FDA-type testing
would reveal such long-term and perhaps serious reactions, the British
system postpones discovery of such reactions until the post-marketing
stage. The British system's relatively narrower threshold for drug
334. Rosemary Pierce Wall, International Trends in New Drug Approval Regulation: The
Impact on PharmaceuticalInnovation, 10 RuTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 317, 323-26 (1984)
[hereinafter Wall, International Trends].
335. Julie C. Relihan, Note, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An International
Approach, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229, 245 (1995).
336. See id. at 245-47.
337. See generally DAVID C. GREEN, MEDICINES IN THE MARKETPLACE (1987).
338. See Wall, InternationalTrends, supra note 334, at 324-26.

339. See, e.g., id. at 325.
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certification and licensing extends to its exceptions. Hence, for example,
there is an exception to certification of new drugs for therapeutic purposes
in cases of terminally-ill patients.14' However, under this exception, no
clinical testing
is required, unlike under the FDA's Treatment IND
1

program.

34

The British process of drug certification and licensing, unlike the U.S.
system, is not driven by the public's perceptions of risk as a result of drug
related tragedies. The British process is also insulated from pharmaceutical
industry and government pressures due to the use of independent advisory
committees. The advent. of the AIDS crisis in Britain has resulted in a
balancing of governmental intrusion to address the health crisis with the
need to maintain the certification and licensing authorities' autonomy.342
Overall, drug approval is cheaper and faster in Britain than in the United
States in at least three respects. First, the British experience gives postmarket surveillance a higher premium. Second, the British process
incorporates independent review committees. Third, it also provides for
accelerated access to new and experimental drugs to treat life-threatening
illnesses. As seen above, the FDA has taken steps to address this lengthy
and expensive approval process with a variety of exceptions. 343 These
measures have, however, not led to decreases in the importation of
unapproved drugs into the United States. 3 "

C. A Summary of the Implicationsof the FDA's Regulatory Framework
in the PharmaceuticalIndustryfor Terminally-1ll,Low-End Consumers
The FDA's regulatory framework is "lengthy and bureaucratically rigid
' This is further exacerbated by products
relative to those of other nations."345
liability laws. The implications for consumers and pharmaceutical companies
include increased costs of manufacturing new drugs, higher prices of drugs
for consumers, and long waiting times for new drugs, especially for

340. Relihan, supra note 335, at 246.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See generally Kenneth I. Kaitin et al.,
The Drug Lag: An Update of New Drug
Introductionsin the UnitedStates and Britain,1977 Through 1987,46 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY
& THERAPEUICS 121 (1989).
344. Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatmentsfor HIV and AIDS: Contractarian
Model ofAccess, I1 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 417 (1994).
345. Id. at 404.
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terminally-ill patients. In the United States, these factors have led to a
thriving underground market of unapproved drugs from other countries,
leading terminally-ill patients such as those with AIDS to encounter
unknown levels of risk exposure.
This state of affairs is not inevitable. Given the territorial manner in
which drug approval agencies work, it is not surprising that there are vastly
different regulatory frameworks from country to country. However,
international cooperation to resolve the AIDS crisis through measures such
as the acceptance of foreign data that demonstrates safety and efficacy
could greatly reduce duplication of research initiatives.346 Although there
may be grounds for skepticism as to the validity of foreign data, the lack of
international cooperation to resolve the AIDS crisis is a reflection of how
jealously countries safeguard sovereign control of drug approval.34 7
In the United States, state or governmental action is immunized from
antitrust scrutiny. However, anti-competitive state or governmental action
is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. In the United States, there is a twopart test for determining whether otherwise uncompetitive conduct is
immune under the state action doctrine.348 Under this test, the challenged
restraint must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy" and "'actively supervised' by the State.' 349 The supervision
requirement prevents states from frustrating federal competition policy by
casting a "gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a
private price fixing agreement. 35°

346. Relihan, supra note 335, at 248.
347. See James O'Reilly, Three Dimensions of Regulatory Problems: United States,
European Economic Community and National Laws, 41 FOOD & DRUG COSM. L.J. 131, 132
(1986).
348. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
349. Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,410 (1978)); see
also S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1985). Another

exception to the immunity of state action against antitrust violations relates to instances in which
the state is acting as a commercial participant. However, it does not apply in this instance. See
Robert Wai, The Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity and the Boundaries of
ContemporaryInternationalLegalism, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 213 (C. Scott ed., 2001).

350. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 (1987) (quoting Cal.Retail Dealers,445
U.S. at 106). It is also arguable that anticompetitive governmental conduct violates a general
principle of international law. Under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are a source of international
law. Since international law is based upon consent of states, general principles of law found in a
majority of the national systems of states could very well be indicative of principles of public
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With regard to the FDA, there may be a question as to whether a legislative
scheme that acts as a bar to entry may constitute state policy.351 However,
courts in the United States are only interested in establishing precedent if
the regulatory scheme is a by-product of state action. According to the U.S.
Supreme Court:
Our decisions make clear that the purpose of the active
supervision inquiry is not to determine whether the State has met
some normative standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory
practices. Its purpose is to determine whether the State has exercised
sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details ofthe
rates or prices have been established as a product of deliberate state
intervention, not simply by agreement among private parties.352
Hence, the only inquiry the Court makes in such a case is whether the
regulation is a by-product of state action. Yet, although courts have been
reluctant to interfere with state regulatory authority, there are instances in
which anti-competitive state action, in limiting entry to various trades or
callings, has been prohibited.353 However, given that the FDA is a federal
regulatory body, it is not entirely clear the extent to which courts would
respond to claims that its mandate in establishing the safety and
effectiveness of drugs circumscribes the countervailing public interest in free
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
Yet, there are a variety of reasons that the FDA's regulatory framework
will increase the susceptibility of the pharmaceutical industry to
cartelization. First, the patent regime creates a twenty-year monopoly in the
pharmaceutical industry. This monopoly places returns on investments in
research and development above competition as the best policy to serve
consumer welfare. Hence, although pharmaceuticals are very easy to reengineer, there is almost no gray market for pharmaceuticals, unlike
products enjoying copyright and trademark protection.

international law. A general principal of international law need not be found in all states, but only
in most of them.
351. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
352. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621,634-35 (1992); see also New Eng. Motor Rate
Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1074 (1st Cir. 1990).
353. See, e.g., Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904).
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Shubha Ghosh has argued that patent protection explains the lack of a
gray market in pharmaceuticals. Such gray markets, which allow intrabrand
competition, have resulted in lower consumer products prices in products
other than pharmaceuticals. In a sense, therefore, patent protection, which
is exacerbated by the FDA's mandate, results in the cartelization of the
pharmaceutical industry in a manner that raises drug prices substantially.
Drugs also take longer to get to consumers because of the lengthy drug
approval times. Hence, only high-end consumers can afford drug prices that
result from the regulatory environment, which raises pharmaceutical
research and development costs substantially." 4
It is now considered a truism that monopolists and oligopolists can
accommodate economic downturns better than small firms within an
industry: a benefit for consumers ifthis happens. 3" However, while it is also
true that such market power gives these firms more flexibility in their
pricing policies so that they can recoup their research and development
costs, the inability of small firms to compete effectively with big firms may
act as a disincentive for further research and development. This is especially
the case where patents and other contract restrictions inhibit smaller firms
from entering an industry.356
Arguably, the patent monopoly thus raises the cost of drugs further, as
it reduces competition in the pharmaceutical industry. By contrast,
competition in the steel and automobile industries, which do not have
operation costs or barriers of entry as high as the pharmaceutical industry,
led to a lowering of prices. Competition in the pharmaceutical industry is
also circumscribed by the FDA's regulatory environment, which imposes on
new entrants and small firms in the industry the risk of enormous costs that
threaten their ability to survive with the market leadership of big firms.
In essence, big firms have no incentive to produce for low-end markets
that cannot afford drugs sold in high-end markets. Unlike other industries,
like the automobile industry and the computer industry, which have grown
by and large by re-engineering and recombining ideas, new entrants in the
354. Shubha Ghosh, State Creation ofGray Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights, 14 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 217 (2002).
355. See generally FRED WESTON, CONCENTRATIONAND EFFICIENCY: THE OTHER SIDEOF THE
MONOPOLY ISSUE (1978).

356. See Geoff Tansey, Trade, Intellectual Property, Food and Biodiversity: A Discussion
Paper (1999), available at http://www.btintemet.com/-g.tansey/trips/index.html, cited in John H.
Barton, The Impact ofPatentLaw on Plant Biotechnology Research, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS III GLOBAL GENETIC RESOURCES: ACCESS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS (Steve A. Eberhart et
al. eds., 1998).
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pharmaceutical industry face the costs of intellectual property infringement,
which keep drug prices high.
There is also a collective action problem. No firm would be willing,
without the cooperation of other firms, to lower the prices of their drugs for
low-end markets. However, in the recent past, individual firms have made
commitments to reduce drug prices for AIDS patients in Africa. These
announcements, however, came after the Pharmaceutical Industry Initiative,
which was agreed to under the auspices of UNAIDS in 2000, failed to
produce an industry-wide initiative. The incentives for individual companies
to make their individual announcements of price cuts to accommodate
pressure on the industry are a reflection of a lack of more thorough
initiatives; this situation has come about as a result of the lack of incentives
to cooperate in finding a sustainable solution to the crisis.
A case could be made that pharmaceutical firms in situations of upward
growth could sell their drugs at cost to low-end consumers without
undermining their efficiency or bottom-line. Indeed, recent research shows
that these companies expend a lot of money marketing their AIDS drugs
unnecessarily, as they have such a discrete market in which information on
available cocktails is very well-known especially in high-end markets.
Marketing costs rose following the FDA's 1997 relaxation of a rule that
prohibited direct-to-consumer advertising. In 1998, "America's
pharmaceuticals report[ed] spending $24 billion on research and
development but almost three times that amount, $68 billion, on marketing,
35 These expenditures could be misdirected,
advertising and administration.""
given that cocktails are very individualized in the sense that they depend on
an individual's medical history and other personal attributes. In essence, the
resources unnecessarily spent on advertising AIDS drugs could be
redirected towards either reduced prices of drugs for low-end markets or
other similar solutions, such as increasing drug production to lower prices.
Given that a primary purpose of antitrust law today is to maximize
consumer welfare in terms of lower prices, the issue of inefficient
competition between small firms does not arise in a period of upward
growth in the pharmaceutical industry. It is clear that competition in the
pharmaceutical industry between the upwardly-mobile, big pharmaceutical
companies and small competitors will help bring prices down, as the

357. Daniel Zingale, Silence = S, availableat http://www. thebody.com/aac/ju12099.html
(July 20, 1999).
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example of Cipla, the Indian company, demonstrates.358 Needless to say,
spending on AIDS drugs has expanded enormously by 1146%, from $129.2
million in 1993 to $1.48 billion in 1998."' It could be argued that having so
benefited from the AIDS pandemic, the pharmaceutical industry is morally
indebted to AIDS patients around the world. 3 °

VI. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have argued that there is potential for market-based
arguments to advance legal and social causes such as the provisioning of
AIDS drugs and other health services to low-end income consumers. This
approach, in my view, expands the repertoire of institutional possibilities
and options for those committed to addressing the global AIDS pandemic.
In addition, I have sought to demonstrate that an assimilation of a variety
of intellectual approaches to resolving this crisis is possible while examining
a problem that sits at the intersection of a variety of disciplines.
Hence, in Part II, I critically explored the possibilities and limitations of
using a rights framework to address access to AIDS drugs and services
using the South African Constituitional courts jurisprudence on social and
economic rights. In Parts III, IV, and V, I sought to unravel, through
demystification of economic rhetoric, that market-based claims have a
potential for a humanist application in favor of low-end income consumers
infected with HIV. For example, in Part III and IV, I advocated exploiting
the tension inherent in the WTO's mandate with regard to the place of
social issues alongside its mandate to lower barriers to trade. I did this by
examining exceptions to the exclusivity of patent protection, such as
through Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, as well as the possibilities for
compulsory and parallel licensing embedded in TRIPS. In addition,
developing countries have discretion in implementing TRIPS to set very
high standards for patentability, thereby legally excluding from patent
protection products or processes that would be inconsistent with a
country's legal standards.
In Part V, I advocated a competition-based critique of the operation of
the pharmaceutical industry as one of the reasons for the lack of expeditious

358. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
359. Zingale, supra note 357.
360. See generally MICHAEL SANTORO, PROFITS AND PRINCIPLES:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (2000).

GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND

HeinOnline -- 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 351 2001-2002

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW[

(Vol. 14

access to affordable AIDS drugs for low-end consumers. That is, the FDA
has placed a high premium on safety and effectiveness of AIDS drugs
without taking into account their access and affordability, especially to lowend consumers. I have argued that changes at the FDA, such as acceptance
of foreign data to prove safety and efficacy of drugs approved in countries
with which the United States has reciprocity treaties, could increase access
to affordable drugs. In addition, it is plausible to argue that increased
competition in the pharmaceutical industry, which might result in adopting
a hybrid framework between the present framework and the British
experience, would have a desirable outcome for low-end consumers facing
life-threatening diseases.
By expanding the repertoire of bases upon which the cause of those
infected with HIV for access to affordable drugs and other services can be
pursued to include market-based rather than only rights/legal strategies, I
hope has contributed in whatever small way continue creative thinking on
how best to advance social causes within larger institutional domains and
contexts.
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